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CRITICAL RACE PRAXIS:
RACE THEORY AND POLffiCAL
LAWYERING PRACTICE IN POST
CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA

Eric K. Yamamoto*
PROLOGUE
At the end of the twentieth century, the legal status of Chinese
Americans in San Francisco's public schools turns on a requested
judicial finding that a desegregation order originally designed to
dismantle a system subordinating nonwhites now invidiously dis
criminates against Chinese Americans. Brian Ho, Patrick Wong,
and Hilary Chen, plaintiffs in Ho v. San Francisco Unified School
District,1 represent "all [16,000] children of Chinese descent" eligi
ble to attend San Francisco's public schools.2 Their high-profile
suit, filed by small-firm attorneys, challenges the validity of a 1983
judicial consent decree desegregating San Francisco's schools. Ap
proved in response to an NAACP class action charging educational
discrimination by whites, the consent decree mandates racial and
ethnic diversity in student bodies and sets for each "magnet" school
a forty-percent cap for students from any racial or ethnic group.3
* Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai'i. J.D.
1978, Boalt. - Ed. Copyright Eric K. Yamamoto 1996. I am deeply grateful to Angela
Harris, Gerald L6pez, Sumi Cho, and Dale Minami for their inspiring work and counsel. I
am also especially appreciative of Susan Serrano for her invaluable contributions as principal
researcher. My thanks also to research assistants Juliette Sheehan Dwight, Francis Leung,
Dayna-Ann Mendonca, Issac Moriwake, Dan Mueller, and Sheri Ritter.

1. See First Amended Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief for
Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 at 1, Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8,
1986) (No. C-94-2418-WHO) [hereinafter First Amended Complaint].
2. See Memorandum Decision and Order at 8, Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist.,
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 1996) (No. C-94-2418-WHO) [hereinafter Memorandum Decision and
Order].
3. See Consent Decree, San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist, 576 F.
Supp. 34, 53 (N.D. Cal. 1983) [hereinafter Consent Decree]. The Consent Decree categorizes
students into one of nine racial or ethnic groups: Spanish surname, Other White, Black,
Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Filipino, American Indian, and Other Non-White. See Consent
Decree, supra, at 5. It requires that at least four racial or ethnic groups be represented at
each school. See id. at 6. To assure diversity the decree caps at 40% the enrollment of any
particular group at any "alternative school" (or "magnet" school such as Lowell High
School) and at 45% at any regular school. See id. The plaintiffs assert that but for the cap,
Chinese Americans now would matriculate in numbers in excess of 40% based on entrance
exam scores. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 9.
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Early on, Chinese Americans benefited from the decree's diversity
mandate, substantially increasing their enrollments.4
The Chinese American plaintiffs now seek to exceed the forty
percent cap by claiming that the cap constitutes unconstitutional
race preferencing for those less qualified, particularly African
Americans and Latinos. Discrimination is demonstrated, the plain
tiffs allege, by the denial of magnet school admission to some Chi
nese American students despite their entrance test scores, which
are higher than those of some matriculated students of other races.5
They observe that this form of exclusion is consistent with Califor
nia's history of harsh discrimination against Chinese Americans.6
Using ideas refined by neoconservative race scholars, their attor
neys frame the suit in terms of individual rights, advance legal argu
ments of "meritocracy" and "colorblindness,''7 and seek to enjoin
the school district "from operating under its system of racial classifi
cation and quotas."8 Some Chinese American supporters more di
rectly express perceptions of underlying racial-cultural differences:
formal racism in the system has ended; Chinese Americans have
elevated themselves as a group through ability and cultural values
despite hardship; African Americans have had the benefit of the
decree for ten years "and black students' performance is still bad."9
Some plaintiffs and their supporters imply that Chinese American
educational superiority - as measured by test scores - is at least

4. See Henry Der, The Asian American Factor in the Affirmative Action Debate: Victim
or Shortsighted Beneficiary of Race-Conscious Remedies, in LEAP
COMMON GROUND:
PERSPECTIVES ON AFFIRMATIVE AcnoN (1996) (hereinafter Der, Asian American Factor].
-

5. The complaint alleges:
[S]tudents of Chinese descent were required to score a minimum of 66 out of a possible
69, while applicants who were Other White, Japanese, Korean, Filipino, American In
dian, or Other Non-White were· required to score only 59, and students who were His
panic or African American were required to score 56.
First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 10; see also Der, Asian American Factor, supra
note 4, at 3.
6. See People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854); see also TOMAS ALMAGUER, RACIAL FAULT
LINES (1994).
7. "Plaintiffs simply do not wish to be classified on the basis of race or ethnicity
Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss at 3 n.2, Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 1996) (No. C-942418-WHO) (hereinafter Opposition Memorandum to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss]. See
infra note 40 for discussion of neoconservative race scholarship and its connection to con
servative political lawyering practice.
•

.

•

."

8. First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 18.
9. Mamie Huey, Chinese Americans Have Bone to Pick with Consent Decree,
AsIANWEEK, Jan. 27, 1995, at 5, 8 (hereinafter Huey, Bone to Pick].
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partially a reflection of cultural if not intellectual inferiority of Afri
can Americans and Latinos.10
Plaintiffs' strategy of distancing Chinese Americans from Afri
can Americans is reflected not only in statements of supporters but
also in plaintiffs' legal filings. In those filings,. plaintiffs' attorneys
assert that Chinese American students' interests are contrary to the
interests of African American students represented by the NAACP
and that the NAACP "did not adequately represent" Chinese
Americans in the original desegregation action.11 The attorneys
also contend that the defendant NAACP "is a proponent of the sta
tus quo, while Plaintiffs co�sider the Consent Pecree a violation of
their right to equal protection."12 The NAAC:E�, represented by a
large law firm and a civil rights litigation organization, publicly op
poses the suit and serves -as the primary defender of the consent
decree.13
Chinese American political and cultural organizations are
sharply divided. Some offer strong support for the plaintiffs and
stress the value of individual achievement and educational opportu
nities for Chinese American children.14 Others voice strident oppo
sition, find no evidence of school-choice discrimination again�t
Chinese American students (Chinese constitute by far the single
largest group in magnet schools), question the framing of "merit"
solely on the basis. of an entrance test, and emphasize continuing
systemic impediments to socio-economic advancement by African

10. See supra text accompanying note 9 and infra text accompanying note 18. These ar
guments have received considerable recent public attention. See DINESH D'SouZA, THE
END OF RACISM (1995) (arguing the cultural superiority of descendants of Asia and Western
Europe particularly in comparison with African Americans); RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN &
CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE 272-76 (1994) (construing IQ test information to
mean that Asian Americans and whites are innately more intelligent than African Americans
and Latinos).
11. Opposition Memorandum to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 7, at 10, De
cember 7, 1994.
12. Id.
13. See Mamie Huey, NAACP Sides With SF School District in Ongoing Lowell Saga,
AsIANWEEK, Jan. 20, 1995, at 5. Several organizations, including the Chinese for Affirmative
Action, Mujeres Unidas Y Activas/Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, and the
Latin American Teachers' Association, sought to intervene and support the Consent Decree.
The court denied their request in part because it believed that the San Francisco NAACP
would represent the interests of all minority organizations. The court did allow those organi
zations to participate as amici curiae. See Memorandum Decision and Order at 4, San Fran
cisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. (N.D. Cal. July 22, 1993) (No. C-78-1445WHO).
14. See Huey, Bone to Pick, supra note 9, at 8 (quoting one parent as saying "[p]arents
don't think about ethnic groups, they're concerned with the suitable program for their kids").
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Americans, Native Americans, Latinos, and some Asian
Americans.15
Civil rights lawyers, Asian American organizations, and Califor
nia politicians also diverge in their responses. Those supporting the
suit talk about quotas, injustice, and civil rights. A spokesperson
for the Asian American Legal Foundation indicated that Chinese
Americans "will not stand for injustice and inequality in our com
munity."16 The lawyer delivering the keynote address at the plain
tiffs' fundraiser declared that "[w]e are on the right side of civil
rights" and "we say 'never' to racial quotas on children."17 Legal
supporters also talk about merit and racial differences: the NAACP
"opposes us, but dropout rates for African American students have
never been higher."18 Unsurprisingly, neoconservative politicians
embrace these positions, arguing affirmative action's harm to Asian
Americans as a ground for jettisoning affirmative action
altogether.19
Lawyers and community leaders who oppose the suit talk about
practical consequences. If the plaintiffs succeed, a likely immediate
consequence will be more Asian American and white public school
admittees with significantly fewer African Americans and Lati
nos.20 A likely longer-term consequence may be the legal disman
tling of all race-based affirmative action programs in the state.21
Additionally, the law may well affirm in the public mind the image
of Asian American superiority and African American and Latino
inferiority. In light of probable consequences, a plaintiffs' "victory"
15. See Der, Asian American Factor, supra note 4, at 4 (as executive director of Chinese
For Affirmative Action, opposing the Ho suit on multiple factual and philosophical grounds).
16. Huey, Bone to Pick, supra note 9, at 8.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Frank H. Wu, Behind the GAO Report, AsIANWEEK, Dec. 22, 1995, at 11 (report
ing on white neoconservative politicians' use of Asian Americans to argue for abolition of
affirmative action) .
20. See Der, Asian American Factor, supra note 4, at 4. As a basis for comparison, a
study of the 1994 entering freshmen at UCLA found that if students were admitted on "aca
demic criteria alone" the number of Asians would increase (42.2% to 51.l % ) as would the
number of whites (30.7% to 42.7% ) , while the number of Hispanics and Blacks would decline
sharply: 20% to 5%, and 7.1% to 1.2%, respectively. See Andrew Hacker, Goodbye to Af
firmative Action?, N.Y. REv. OF BooKS, July 11, 1996, at 21 (table summarizing study
results) .
21. One apparent irony of the plaintiffs' position, which if successful will likely under
mine all affirmative action programs, is that Chinese American supporters perceive continu
ing discrimination against Asian Americans in employment, housing and entitlements,
among other things, and support affirmative action in those realms. See Der, Asian American
Factor, supra note 4, at 7-8; Henry Der, Preliminary Analysis of Ho v. San Francisco Unified
School District, Sept. 9, 1994, at para. 57 [hereinafter Der, Preliminary Analysis].
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may well exacerbate African American and Asian American ten
sions already heightened by negative stereotypes held by some
members of each group about the other,22 by intergroup economic
competition,23 and by intergroup justice grievances.24
Interestingly, progressive race theorists have not joined lawyers
and activists behind the scenes or in the litigation trenches.2 5 Nor
has their work, which critically interrogates questions of race, cul
ture, and law, informed the framing, concepts, or language of the
suit.26 Noticeably absent from litigation strategy and legal dis
course is critical inquiry into the connection between law and racial
22. See Loms HARru:s REsEARCH, TAKING AMERICA'S PULSE: THE FALL REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE SURVEY ON INTERGROUP RELATIONS (1994). The poll found

that almost half of all blacks and Latinos believe that Asian Americans are "wary, suspicious,
and unfriendly toward non-Asians and "unscrupulously crafty and devious in business." Id.
Thirty-five percent of Asians and 24% of African Americans think that "Latinos lack ambi
tion and drive to succeed." Id. Thirty-one percent of Asian Americans and 26% of Latinos
agree that "African Americans want to live on welfare." Id. The percentages of minorities
harboring negative stereotypes are significant because they are higher than the percentages
of whites who admit to such attitudes.
23. See infra note 157.
24. Those justice grievances, flowing from both groups, include the killing of Latasha
Harlins by Soon Ja Du in 1991, the Ice Cube rap "Black Korea in 1991," the burning of
Korean American stores in South Central Los Angeles in 1992, and the rancorous debates
about California's Proposition 187 (immigration) and Civil Rights Initiative (affirmative ac
tion). See Jeff Chang, Race, Class, Conflict and Empowerment: On lee Cube's "Black Ko
rea, " AMERASIA J., vol. 97 no. 2, 1993, at 87; Sumi K. Cho, Korean Americans vs. African
Americans: Conflict and Construction, in READING RODNEY KING\READING URBAN UPRIS
ING 196, 196 (Robert Gooding-Williams ed., 1993); Neil Gotanda, Re-Producing the Model
Minority Stereotype: Judge Joyce Karlin's Sentencing Colloquy in People v. Soon Ja Du, in
REVIEWING ASIAN AMERICA 87, 92, 99 (Wendy L. Ng et al. eds., 1995); Our Next Race
Question: The Uneasiness Between Blacks and Latinos, HARPER'S MAG., Apr. 1996, at 55;
infra note 157 (discussing interminority economic competition).
These tensions appear to have been somewhat lessened by multiracial coalition-building
efforts addressing issues of race violence, immigration, and affirmative action. See Samuel R.
Cacas, Minority Lawyers Organize Against California Save Our State Initiative, AsIANWEEK,
Sept. 2, 1994, at 5 (describing community forum encouraging minority lawyers to challenge
California's Proposition 187); Ben Q. Limb, New York Launches Black-Korean Mediation
Project, NAPABA LAWYER, Oct. 1994, at 7 (reporting on Black-Korean mediation project
designed to address intergroup conflict); New Coalition Formed to Address Racism in South
ern California, RAFu SHIMPo, June 12, 1992, at 1 (discussing multiracial women's coalition
committed to the elimination of racism).
25. The two attorneys of record for the San Francisco and California state defendants
work, respectively, for the State Department of Education and as a small-firm practitioner.
Attorneys for the defendant San Francisco NAACP include a large, established California
firm, a San Francisco civil rights organization, and two small-firm practitioners. See Civil
Docket at 103, Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 1996) (No. 94-CV2418). The lawyer for plaintiffs and the class is a named partner in a small San Francisco
firm. In at least one court appearance he was accompanied by a law professor (who did not
appear on the briefs or participate in argument). See id. at 1.

26. Two law students authored Notes in 1995 that discussed the Ho case. See Selena
Dong, Note, "Too Many Asians": The Challenge of Fighting Discrimination Against Asian
Americans and Preserving Affirmative Action, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1045 (1995); Alexandra
Natapoff, Note, Trouble in Paradise: Equal Protection and the Dilemma of Interminority
Group Conflict, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1059 (1995).
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hierarchy, including Asian Americans' purported role as "middle
minority" buffers in the continuing subordination of African Amer
icans; the political construction and implications of meritocracy and
colorblindness in the affirmative action debate, including the mean
ing of objectivity and race consciousness; the dissonant understand
ings of "equality-under-law" (equality-of-opportunity, equality-of
result, and anti-caste); and the sharp limitations of legal process for
subordinated communities seeking racial justice, including the gen
eral failure of legal norms, methods and procedures to foster inter
group healing.27
Also noticeably missing from the legal filings, oral arguments,
and court rulings, which focus on specific procedural or doctrinal
issues, is critical inquiry into the interminority dynamics at the heart
of the case. One aspect of those unstated dynamics is intergroup
power. Is affirmative action, as neoconservatives argue, "discrimi
nation against Asians in order to protect blacks"28 - making Asian
Americans the "new victims" of racism and African Americans,
and to a lesser extent Latinos, the "new perpetrators?" Or is this
construction of interracial conflict a mask for continued white
supremacy? A second aspect of unstated dynamics is the fit of civil
rights law. Is the traditional antidiscrimination-law scheme worka
ble for multiracial conflicts in post-civil rights America? Or is it
necessary to remake the white on black jurisprudential paradigm?
A third aspect is context. How do the volatile mid-1980s Asian
American admissions controversy29 and the mid-1990s California
27. For a discussion of critical inquiry in cases in addition to Ho, see infra notes
and accompanying text (critically analyzing United Minorities Against Discrimination
of San Francisco) and Part IV (describing a critical race praxis).

162·83
v. City

28. DANA Y. TAKAGI, THE RETREAT FROM RACE: ASIAN-AMERICAN ADMISSIONS AND
RACIAL POLITICS 139 (1992). The Asian-versus-black framing informs the support for the
University of California Regents' 1995 decision to tenninate all university affirmative action
programs and the 1996 California ballot initiative to end affirmative action in state govern
ment Conservative Congressman Dana Rohrbacher, in a 1995 press release accompanying a
General Accounting Office report on college adinissions prepared at his request, reiterated
the neoconservative Asian-black rationale for eliininating affirmative action: "Young Asian
Americans are being victimized by quota-based college adinissions policies designed to bene
fit prefe"ed minority groups. . . . The education establishment's race-obsessed admissions
doctrine demonstrably discriininates against Asian Americans." Wu, supra note 19, at 11
(quoting Rohrbacher press statement) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks deleted) .
The "preferred Ininority groups" to which Rohrbacher clearly referred were African Ameri
cans and Latinos.

29. See TAKAGI, supra note 28. The Berkeley controversy started with Asian American
complaints about a hidden quota liiniting adinissions of Asian Americans. The administra
tion's investigation deterinined that the decline was the result of a " 'series of deliberate
policy changes'... instituted [by the University] . .. knowing that they would reduce Asian
American freshman enrollment at Berkeley." Id. at 34 (quoting 1985 report by Asian Ameri
can Task Force on University Adinissions). University officials responded to this revelation
with tortured justifications of diversity and meritocracy, claiining first that Asian American
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Civil Rights Initiative and the University of California affirmative
action repeal30 contextualize the intergroup issues in Ho?31 And
why do intergroup issues of apparent legal and political import,
scrutinized by race scholars, appear to evaporate in Ho amid lawy
erly formulation of legal argument and strategy?
INTRODUCTION
The Ho litigation, I suggest, reveals a disjuncture between pro
gressive race theory and frontline political lawyering practice. In
one realm, undertaking critical inquiry, progressive scholars offer
theoretical insights about Ho's pressing socio-legal issues. In an
other realm, amid growing criticism of race-conscious affirmative
action, the NAACP and state's lawyers defend a race desegregation
order both in court and in the arena of popular opinion. Yet, with
much to share and with racial conditions in the balance, progressive
theorists and lawyers seemingly fail to connect in meaningful ways.
students were overrepresented in universities nationwide (and should therefore be admitted
in lesser numbers) and second that Asian Americans, despite high overall entrance test
scores, were poorly qualified (they were "narrowly concentrated in technical fields and hence
poor all-around candidates for the top schools"). Id. at 58. In the face of compelling criti
cism by scholars and activists and mounting protests, the Berkeley chancellor apologized and
stopped the school's ceiling admissions practice for Asian Americans. See id. at 139.
The chancellor's apology hardly ended the controversy. Neoconservative politicians and
activists, initially uninterested in Asian American civil rights, endeavored to shift the terms of
the debate from Asian American exclusion in admissions to a general attack on affirmative
action. Congressman Dana Rohrbacher, a sponsor of legislation to eliminate affirmative ac
tion in college admissions, in a 1989 speech to the Heritage Foundation, explained the reason
for using Asian Americans to criticize affirmative action: "In a way, we want to help Asian
Americans, but at the same time we're using it as a vehicle to correct what we consider to be
a societal mistake." Wu, supra note 19, at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). To justify
"correcting the mistake," neoconservatives argued that affirmative action for blacks and Lati
nos harmed Asian Americans (and whites).
Support from commentators such as Dinesh D'Souza (an Asian American who aligned
Asians with whites against African Americans and Latinos, see, e.g., DINESH D'SouZA, ILUB
ERAL EnuCATION (1991), and heightened media coverage of neoconservative positions), re
cast the Asian American admissions debate. Dana Takagi unravels the shifting discourse:
"Whereas Asian American organizations .. .accused ... officials of discrimination against
Asians in order to protect whites, neoconservatives charged university officials with discrimi
nation against Asians in order to protect blacks. According to neoconservative claims, dis
crimination was a matter
between blacks and Asians." TAKAGI, supra note 28, at 139.
30. See Bill Wong, Now Under Attack, Affirmative Action ls Complex, Contentious,
AsIANWEEK, Feb. 24, 1995, at 9 (describing the Regents' vote to end university affirmative
action and the California Civil Rights Initiative).
31. Henry Der, community activist and former head of Chinese for Affirmative Action,
aptly connects Ho with the University of California controversies and identifies a paramount
challenge for Asian Americans in intergroup relations: "The true challenge facing Asian
Americans today is not whether more Chinese or Asians can be enrolled at Lowell or UC
Berkeley, but whether we will play a responsible role in creating and maintaining a multira
cial democracy." Der, Asian American Factor, supra note 4, at 7-8. With that challenge
comes a warning: "If not, Asian Americans face the real possibility of playing a leading role
in a segregated society." Id. at 8.
. • .
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The disjuncture reflects something more than scholars coldly scruti
nizing judicial opinions and lawyers heatedly struggling through the
immediacy of adversarial decisionmaking. Something more is at
play.
The Ho litigation also reveals another kind of separation influ
encing political lawyering practice: an intensifying dissociation of
law (as it conceives of justice) from racial justice (as it is exper
ienced by racialized groups). Ho illuminates three dimensions of
this dissociation through its awkward embrace of a constricted civil
rights law paradigm: First, the Chinese American plaintiffs appear
to ignore the historical linkage of law and cultural representations
to legalized racial oppression. They support their civil rights claims
to equality under the law by disparaging other "less deserving" ra
cial groups. Second, they uncri!ically employ rhetoric and assert
claims shaped initially by African American civil rights struggles
and recast later by neoconservative politicians and jurists to under
mine minority claims of institutional racism and to sanction white
claims of "reverse discrimination." In doing so, the plaintiffs gener
ate confusion and anger among African Americans, Latinos, and
other Asian Americans about the purpose of antidiscrimination
laws and about Ho's social meaning and impact. Third, and related,
the plaintiffs invoke a civil rights paradigm that understands racial
conflict narrowly in white-on-black, perpetrator-and-victim terms
and fails to account for the unique dimensions of interracial group
grievances and to facilitate possibilities for intergroup healing.
Although of continuing significance in ways discussed later,
legal justice under the civil rights paradigm employed in Ho in
creasingly is experienced by r�cialized communities as racial injus
tice. Indeed, "embittered" and "frustrated and misunderstood" is
how a professor and civil rights attorney describes her racial minor
ity clients after "encounters with civil rights enforcement."32 These
experiences are symptomatic of the law's intensifying dissociation
from racial justice, or what one sociologist calls America's "retreat
from racial justice."33
Why the disjuncture? Why the dissociation? And what might
be done? Put another way: In post-civil rights America, how might
theorists, lawyers, and activists bridge both the "gap of chasmic pro
portions"34 between progressive race theory and political lawyering
32. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
33. See infra Part II.
34. Margaret M. Russell, De Jure Revolution?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1173, 1175 (1995) [here
inafter Russell, Revolution].
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practice and the growing divide between law and racial justice?
This article responds to the question of bridging. It offers the be
ginnings of a critical race praxis.
The first two Parts assess the problems just identified. Part I
addresses a problem sensed by many but written about by few the disjuncture between progressive race theory and political lawy
ering practice. This disjuncture is especially problematic for those
on the left in light of the coalescence of conservative race theory
and political practice into a neoconservative praxis.
Part II addresses the intensifying dissociation of law from racial
justice. This Part first describes the linkage of race and culture to
legal injustice. It then examines the increasing constriction of civil
rights antidiscrimination law for racial minorities, sketching five
socio-legal explanations. Finally, exploring litigation of the

Minorities

United

case, Part II identifies a salient limit of the traditional

white-on-black civil rights paradigm: jurisprudential blindness to
color-on-color.
Part III, responding to problems of disjuncture and dissociation,
locates the rethinking of progressive race theory and political lawy
ering practice in a contemporary jurisprudence of reconstruction.
Borrowing its name from post-civil war antislavery laws, that juris
prudence endeavors to reconstruct current antidiscrimination law
realistically to address racial subordination in American society.
For critical race theorists, that jurisprudence inhabits the tension
between postmodernism, with its despairing unpacking of legal lib
eralism, and modernism, with its concepts of truth and justice that
for people of color "have always been both indispensable and inad
equate."35 This Part also identifies the "practical tum" in critical
race theory's reconstructive jurisprudence - a tum that employs
tools of critical pragmatic inquiry to remake specific legal doctrines
and evaluate aspects of legal process. My critique of the limits of
that practical tum
its emphasis on courts and doctrine - leads
to the beginning development in Part IV of what I call critical race
-

praxis.
Critical race praxis combines critical, pragmatic, socio-legal
analysis with political lawyering and community organizing to prac
tice justice by and for racialized communities. Its central idea is
that racial justice requires antisubordination practice. In addition
to ideas and ideals, justice is something experienced through prac35. Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL L. REV.
741, 744 (1994) [hereinafter Harris, Jurisprudence of Reconstruction].
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tice. As developed in Part IV, critical race praxis requires an un
derstanding of justice in terms of both method - experience
rethinking-translation-engagement - and norm - first principles
of antisubordination and rectification of injustice. It requires, in ap
propriate instances, using, critiquing, and moving beyond notions of
legal justice pragmatically to heal disabling intergroup wounds and
forge intergroup alliances. It also requires, for race theorists, en
hanced attention to theory translation and deeper engagement with
frontline practice; and for political lawyers and community activists,
increased attention to a critical rethinking of what race is, how civil
rights are conceived, and why law sometimes operates as a discur
sive power strategy.
What I offer in Part IV is a framework rather than a fully devel
oped critical race praxis. As part of that framework, and drawing
selectively upon insights of critical race theory, pragmatism, pro
phetic theology; feminist legal theory, and environmental justice
scholarship, I suggest four starting points of race praxis inquiry: the
conceptual, the performative, the material, and the reflexive. These
starting points do not prescribe what racial justice is, or should be,
in any particular situation. Rather, they offer guideposts toward
collective, reflective antisubordination practice.
Part IV closes with a discussion of three main implications of
critical race praxis: The first is the grounding of justice in concrete
racial realities. It requires exploring the experiences of racial com
munities and locating theory development and application within
their antisubordination struggles. The second is the reframing of
racial justice claims and court process as cultural performances.
This requires rethinking the cultural and communicative dimen
sions of justice claims, starting with law and emphasizing pragmatic
conceptions of justice for racial groups. The third implication is the
development of an interracial praxis. This praxis acknowledges
continuing white dominance in many spheres of socio-economic life
and expands justice inquiry beyond white on black and even white
on color to encompass color on color. As part of that inquiry, an
interracial praxis explores prospects of intergroup healing and as
sesses racial group agency and responsibility both enlivened and
constrained by multiple contexts.
I.

THE DISJUNCTURE BETWEEN PROGRESSIVE RACE THEORY
AND POLITICAL LAWYERING PRACTICE
.

In post-civil rights America progressive race theorists, political
lawyers, and community activists encounter a disjuncture between
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race theory and lawyering practice.36 On the one hand, those theo
rists, lawyers, and activists tend to respond in similar ways to
America's rethinking of what justice means in a multicultural soci
ety. They acknowledge and struggle against growing despair in
communities of color that are experiencing political and legal re
trenchment of modest socio-economic gains,37 and they recognize
and struggle against antidiscrim.ination law's constricted approach
to racial justice.38 They engage in these struggles for at least one
common ideological reason: the elimination or diminution of the
material, real-world conditions of racial oppression. This, for them,
defines racial justice.39
On the other hand, unlike the close connection between ne
oconservative race theory and political activism,40 progressive race
36. I define "progressive race theorist" and "political lawyer" broadly to encompass
those committed to the elimination of racial oppression as part of a larger interconnecting
project that seeks to eliminate all forms of subordination, including subordination based on
gender, class, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, and disability. See generally MAru
J. MATSUDA ET AL, WORDS THAT WOUND: CRmCAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH,
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6-7 (1993) (describing how critical race theory works toward
the broader goal of ending all forms of oppression); Francisco Valdes, Sissies, Dykes, and

Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in
Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL L. REv.1 (1995) (describing the difference and

interconnection among categories of subordination).
37. See STEPHEN STEINBERG, TURNING BACK: THE RETREAT FRoM RACIAL JusncE IN
AMERICAN THOUGHT AND POLICY 213 (1995); see also Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race,
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101
HARV. L. REv.1331 (1988) (describing increasing conservative hostility toward civil rights
reforms); infra note 82.
38. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
39. For recent inquiries into race theory, poverty law and political lawyering practice, see
Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 GEo.LJ. 2567 (1993); Angelo N. Ancheta,
Community Lawyering, 81 CAL L. REv. 1363 (1993) (reviewing GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBEL
LIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW P RACTICE (1992)); Ger
ald P. L6pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious
Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603 (1989); Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and
Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 Prrr. L. REv. 723 (1991); Wtlliam P. Quigley, Re

flections of Community Organizers: Lawyering for Empowerment of Community Organiza
tions, 21 Omo N.U. L. REv. 455 (1994); Conference, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration
of Progressive Thought and Action, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992).
40. Neoconservative race theory is often generated by scholars at conservative think
tanks such as the Heritage Foundation. See MICHAEL OMI & HO WARD WINANT, RACIAL
FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 14-23 (2d ed. 1994) (describing neoconservative race
theory and its genesis). Over the last decade and a half those scholars have dissected tradi
tional civil rights theory and practice. They now conclude that the civil rights approach to
antidiscrimination law is largely illegitimate. Commitments to ending institutional racism
and to a methodology of adversariness are not only unnecessary but divisive in a society no
longer tolerant of intentional racial discrimination by the bad-hearted. See D'SouZA, supra
note 10; THOMAS SOWELI., C!vIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 138-40 (1984). Continu
ing socio-economic disadvantage for some racial groups is a result of group cultural deficien
cies. Prominent neoconservative theorists define racial justice according to notions of
colorblindness and equality of process in present-day decisionmaking. See SOWELL, supra, at
109; SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OuR CHARACTER (1990). These notions form the
cornerstone of neoconservative political lawyering on race issues. See generally Charles,
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theory and political lawyering practice often seem to connect tenu
ously at best.41 Race theorists, particularly legal race theorists, and
political lawyers often seem to operate in separate realms: the for
mer in the realm of ideologies, discursive strategies, and social con
structions; the latter in the realm of civil rights statutes, restrictive
doctrinal court rulings, messy client management, discovery bur
dens, and politically conservative judges;42 the former in the etheLawrence, III, The Epidemiology of Color-Blindness: Learning to Think and Talk About
Race, Again, 15 B.C. TIDRD WORLD L.J. 1 (1995) (describing how these ideas translate into
arguments against affirmative action). These notions enable neoconservatives to argue
against overt racism and in favor of equality while seeking to maintain social structures that
subordinate racial minorities. They also undergird organized, frontline, anti-immigrant, anti
affirmative action, and antiwelfare challenges in the courts, universities, legislatures, govern
ment bureaucracies, and voting booths. The marriage of theory and practice has given birth
to a potent neoconservative race praxis. See OM1 & WmANT, supra, at 128-35; infra note 82.

41. I informally interviewed race scholars, political lawyers, and community activists in
volved with progressive race work. My account of their responses is impressionistic, and I
believe, warrants empirical study. Everyone I talked with agreed that the disjuncture be
tween progressive race theory and political lawyering practice exists. Disagreements cen
tered on its extent, the reasons for it, and what to do about it. The most common explanation
for the disjuncture was that the mainstream backlash against justice for racial minorities is so
extensive within each person's working realm that day-to-day coping requires all-consuming
effort, allowing little opportunity to cross-connect with work in other realms, and thus leaving
little time for practitioners to integrate theory and for theorists to do practice.
Explanations offered for relative nonengagement with frontline legal-political activism by
theorists include the shopworn - ivory tower academics unconnected with the real world;
the extreme postmodern - law is power is politics and resort to legal rhetoric and process
are futile; the "lack of experience" thesis - scholars emerging in the Reagan-Bush era gener
ally have little personal experience with large-scale political activism and local community
struggles; and the careerism factor - some race scholars may be more interested in building
personal careers "using" race than in making a difference for racial communities. Explana
tions offered for relative nonengagement with progressive race theory by political lawyers
include inertia - traditional civil rights litigation is what attorneys are used to; timing most critical theory development has occurred recently, after political lawyers were already
"out there"; energy depletion - frontline battles are so energy consuming that there is no
space for abstract study; impracticality - the practical payoff of abstract theory study is
minimal; and the commodification of civil rights work - litigating civil rights discrimination
and harassment claims is a lucrative business now undertaken "as business" by mainstream
law firms.
Informal interviews were conducted with William Hoshijo, executive director of Na Loio
No Na Kanaka ("Lawyers for the People") (Asian immigration); Elizabeth Pa Martin, man
aging attorney of the Native Hawaiian Advisory Council (Hawaiian cultural rights advocacy);
Dale Minami, San Francisco civil rights lawyer (lead counsel in the Korematsu v. U.S. coram
nobis action); Edward Chen, staff attorney for the Northern California ACLU (English-Only
and hate speech); Denise Antolini, former managing attorney for the Hawaii Sierra Club
Legal Defense Fund (environmental justice); Charles Ka'ai'ai, Hawaiian Homelands activist;
Angela Harris, law professor (race theory and environmental justice); Sherilyn Ifill, law pro
fessor and former civil rights litigator (race and civil rights); Francisco Valdes, law professor
(race theory and queer theory); Gerald L6pez, law professor and community law clinic super
visor (community antisubordination practice); Marina Hsieh, law professor and former litiga
tor for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (civil rights and procedure); Mari Matsuda, law
professor (race theory and affirmative action); and Julie Su, Staff Attorney for the Asian
Pacific American Law Center (community activist and political lawyer).
42. See generally Russell, Revolution, supra note 34 (describing the disconnection be
tween progressive theory and practice); Anthony V. Alfieri, Practicing Community, 107
HAR.v. L. RE V. 1747 (1994) (reviewing GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE
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real realm of postmodern critiques of knowledge and power;43 the
latter in traditional civil rights rhetoric and strategies.44
This disjuncture appears to be a phenomenon of post-civil rights
America. Through the midstages of the civil rights movement, so
cial scientists illuminated the structures and effects of segregation in
myriad aspects of social life and theorists offered political move
ments a rights foundation of integration and equal opportunity.45
These scholars combined with politicians, activists, and lawyers to
challenge apartheid and remake racial justice. Their alliance suc
ceeded in passing antidiscrimination legislation, achieved seemingly
favorable judicial decisions, and established antipoverty and affirm
ative action programs.46 Political lawyering practice employed law

CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992)) (noting the lack of practice anal
ysis by critical race and critical legal scholars).

43.

For a discussion concerning critical theory and racial justice inquiry, see infra Part III.

44. See GERAID P. L6PEZ, REBELUous LAWYERING (1993). L6pez identifies the "tradi
tional" civil rights-legal services paradigm of lawyering for social change. Calling it the "reg
nant" idea of lawyering, he describes a lawyer-centered (client-peripheral) approach to
justice issues that is characterized by an emphasis on specific legal outcomes, is animated by
legal analysis of case opinions, and searches out clients and contacts community organiza
tions to enhance prospects for favorable legal outcomes. The implicit assumption of this
approach is that legal victories gained and favorable precedents established will set in motion
change in societal attitudes and institutional structures. See id. at 24. L6pez views this ap
proach as sharply limited for several reasons, including its disempowering lawyer-centered
(rather than community-focused) methodology, its overreliance on narrow legal outcomes,
and its misperception of the ways in social structural changes occur. See id. at 29. ·
Kimberle Crenshaw also observes that the traditional civil rights lawyering paradigm,
although effective in important respects, rests on largely false assumptions about Ameriea's
deep-seated commitment to equality and about America's resulting slow but certain march
toward racial justice. It also mistakenly assumes the centrality of law and civil rights adjudi
cation (and precedent) in the restructuring of social institutions and government. See Cren
shaw, supra note 37, at 1346-47; see also Mari J. Matsuda, The Keynote Address: Progressive
Civil Liberties, 3 TEMPLE Par... C.R. L. REv. 9 (1993-94) (distinguishing the "traditional civil
liberties approach" from the "progressive civil liberties approach").

45. Social scientists, particularly social psychologists and historians, contributed signifi
cantly to a reconceptualization of race itself and the impacts of racial segregation. From
physicist Franz Boas (debunking the biological intelligence theory of race) to psychologist
John Dollard (identifying settled social patterns producing advantages to whites) to social
psychologist Kenneth Clark (describing the negative effects of segregation on student learn
ing), social scientists and theorists played an integral role in the civil rights movement. See
RICHARD KLuoER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 308-24 (1977) (describing major contributions of social
scientists and race theorists).
46. See KLuGER, supra note 45 (describing civil rights movement struggles and resulting
success of the Brown decision in outlawing segregation); William Simon, Visions of Practice
in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REv. 468, 499 (1984) (observing how a combination of judicial
decisionmaking, electoral politics, and popular mobilization produced civil rights movement
successes); see also PAUU MURRAY, SONG IN A WEARY THROAT (1987) (describing law
professors working closely with political lawyers in crafting progressive civil rights strategy).
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and newly recognized civil rights in efforts to change government
and private institutions.47
Since the late 1960s, however, steady attacks on civil rights by
neoconservative scholars and politicians undermined legal justice
for racial minorities and increasingly constrained progressive lawy
ering practice. A conservative backlash fueled by the Reagan ad
ministration's hostility toward public interest groups and
abandonment of antidiscrimination programs threatened gains
made by racial minorities.48 Lawyers and activists, while rethinking
the role of political lawyers and adjusting to practical constraints,
struggled within the shrinking confines of the civil rights para
digm.49 By contrast, race scholars adopted an increasingly critical
posture. They developed sharp critiques, not only of neoconserva
tive race theory and its potent impact on law and politics, but also
of liberal legal theory and civil rights law.so
Progressive race theorists' many enlightening insights about
race, law, and social power, however, tended to reach a limited
scholarly audience because those insights were marked by their
often difficult translatability into political lawyering and community
activism concepts and language.51 An emerging reconstructive ju
risprudence, discussed below, is beginning to address this difficulty
and the disjuncture between high theory and frontline practice.
Despite these efforts, however, a recent comment by a political law
yer about progressive race theory ideas and writing is revealing:
They are "intriguing but not particularly helpful."52 They are not
particularly helpful to what political lawyers and community groups
do in practice when they confront racial oppression within and be
yond the courtroom. The comment conveys in other terms the

47. See NAN AR.oN, LmERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL 3, 85 {1989) (examining the role of
public interest groups of the 1960s and 1970s and their use of the courts to protect rights of
historically unrepresented groups).
48. See id. at 13-14; see also Crenshaw, supra note 37, at 1337-38.
49. See AR.oN, supra note 47, at 96 {describing political lawyers' limited strategies beyond
use of court system). This expansion, however, has been quite limited. See Alan Freeman,
Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989, 64 TuL. L. REV. 1407 {1990) (critiquing in
creasingly constricted civil rights antidiscrimination law paradigm).
50. See infra notes in section III.A.
51. See Raneta Lawson, Critical Race Theory as Praxis: A View From Outside the
Outside, 38 How. LJ. 353, 369 (1995) (arguing that the "future of critical race theory is
dependent on its ability to expand its [academic] audience base into new spheres of influence,
including courts, politicians, the bar and the general public," by addressing "real-world" con
cerns and transforming theory into practice).
52. Interview with Dale Minami, in San ·Francisco, Cal. (Oct. 15, 1995).
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commonly expressed concern about the scholarly syndrome of "dis
course unto death [such that t]heory begets no practice. "53
Margaret Russell brings this disjuncture into sharp relief
through her call for a nexus between critical theory and progressive
practice. In a review of Crusaders in the Courts, by Jack Greenberg,
and Failed Revolutions, by Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic,54
Russell identifies a "gap of chasmic proportions " between Green
berg's endorsement of the traditional civil rights paradigm for social
change and Delgado and Stefancic's criticism of contemporary
political lawyering practice's failure to undertake critical inquiry.
The civil rights paradigm heralded in Crusaders urges political law
yers to "continue the noble crusade" toward a "nonracist, egalita
rian society. "55 From this view, progressive practice involves
lawyer-centered decisionmaking and the role of lawyer as "every
day hero" in using courts, legal decisions, and litigation to resist and
dismantle structures of racial discrimination.56
This traditional civil rights law approach to social change, Del
gado and Stefancic argue, contributes in the long run to social and
political stagnation and even regression.57 They assert that the ap
proach encourages a false belief in incremental progress that dis
guises the profound need for social structural change.5s They also
connect a lack of social structural change to a failure to "decon
struct the larger structural, institutional, and attitudinal barriers
53. Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What is a White Woman Any
& FEMINISM 13 (1991).
54. See Russell, Revolution, supra note 34 (reviewing JACK GREENBERG, CRusADERS IN
THE COURTS: How A DEDICA'IED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE C!vIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION (1994) and RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN S'IEFANCIC, FAILED REVOLUTIONS:
way?, 4 YALE J.L.

AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION (1994)).
55. Id. at 1174 (describing Greenberg's view).
56. See id. supra note 34, at 1177. Aron reaffirms the civil rights paradigm even while
acknowledging its inadequacy. He recognizes lawyers' attempts to diversify tactics and re
cruit lobbyists, community organizers, and researchers while observing that "litigation still
remains the sine qua non of public interest law." ARoN, supra note 47, at 96. He emphasizes
litigation's role in empowering disadvantaged groups, settling disputes fairly, and restructur
ing public institutions. See id. at 97; see also Come! West, The Role of Law in Progressive
Politics, 43 VAND L. REv. 1797 (1990) (identifying the deficiencies of existing legal structures
while acknowledging the indispensable role of courts for the future of progressive politics).
But see GIRARDEAU SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT (1993) (discussing how the political
lawyer's reliance on the conservative court system hinders acquisition of minority political
power). My comments here are not made to disparage the significant achievements of the
civil rights movement and are meant only as a critique of the applicability of traditional
approaches to contemporary racial conditions.
57. See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN S'IEFANCIC, FAILED REVOLUTIONS: SOCIAL RE
FORM AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION xv (1994) [hereinafter DELGADO &
S'IEFANCIC, FAILED REVOLUTIONS].
58. See id. at xvii.
SOCIAL REFORM

.

.
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that insidiously frustrate truly radical reform."59 For Delgado and
Stefancic, the solution lies not in heroism but in counterhegemony
- in challenging the "influence of legal ideologies and institutions
that limit our capacity to imagine and implement radical solutions
to society's ills. "60
Although progressive theorists such as Delgado and Stefancic
raise broad concerns about the limits of traditional civil rights prac
tice, Russell aptly observes that their general suggestions leave
unaddressed the ways in which political lawyering can meet con
temporary demands of frontline antisubordination practice.61 Rec
ognizing this disconnectedness, Russell calls for a theoretics of
practice for progressive scholars and lawyers to "both facilitat[e]
social change and understand[ ] the hidden deterrents to such
change. "62
The disjuncture is revealed practically in the limited par
ticipatory and intellectual presence of progressive race scholars,
and particularly legal scholars, in the frontline race-law-politics
struggles of the mid-1990s. Those struggles encompass increasing
violence against people of color and state legislation and court rul
ings that incarcerate more African American males for longer peri
ods;63 Congressional legislation to transform the welfare system; to
limit immigration (primarily Latino and Asian), to restrict benefits
and rights of legal immigrants, and to require English Only;64 Cali59. Russell, Revolution, supra note 34, at 1188 (summarizing Delgado and Stefancic's
position).
60. Id. at 1175. Delgado and Stefancic ask:
How do lawyers and legal scholars replicate and rehearse old arguments, seldom break
ing free to new planes of legal thought and innovation? Why do maverick thinkers find
themselves without a community, and how are outsiders marginalized, their voices
tamed and silenced?
. . . How do objective rules and practices favor the more powerful?
DELGADO & ST:EFANCIC, FAILED REVOLUTIONS, supra note 57, at xvi.
61. For instance, Delgado and Stefancic suggest "distrust[ing] the ability of free-market
solutions" and "pay[ing] particular attention to what our mavericks and reformers are say
ing." DELGADO & STEFANCIC, FAILED REVOLUTIONS, supra note 57, at 143.
62. Russell, Revolution, supra note 34, at 1176. Russell thus asks "what does it mean or could it mean - to combine the theoretical insights of critical race jurisprudence with the
conservatizing pressures and demands of everyday public interest practice?" Id. at 1194.
This inquiry might encompass how a "postmodernist critique of law reform could or should
affect, for example, the micro-level decisions of client representation, choice of impact strate
gies, lawyer-client interaction, and client autonomy." Id.
63. See Jerry Kang, Note, Racial Violence Against Asian Americans, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1926 (1993) (describing heightening racial violence); Louis Freedburg, New Jump in Rate of
Incarceration of Black Males, SAN FRANCISCO CHRoN., Oct. 5, 1995, at Al (describing legis
lative and court actions increasing number and duration of Black male incarcerations).
64. See Clinton Will Sign Welfare Overhaul, Cm. TruB., July 31, 1996, § 1, at 1; Frank Wu,
Advanced English Only, AsIANWEEK, May 31, 1996, at 11.
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fornia's anti-affirmative action "Civil Rights Initiative";65 and the
constitutional challenge to California's anti-immigrant Proposition
187.66 At a recent conference of progressive race scholars, observ
ers worried that those scholars had "become too concerned with the
technical jargon of post-modernism" and with matters of little polit
ical relevance and that the gathering "was not politicized enough"
given its roots in community organizing and the presence of overtly
conservative ballot measures and legislation.67
The absence of the scholar-lawyer-activist mix is especially nota
ble in two California controversies that raise complex interracial
Ho v. San Francisco Unified School District, 68 dis

justice issues. In

cussed at the outset, and United Minorities v. San Francisco, 69 a
1994 Title VII employment discrimination action by African Amer
icans and Latinos in effect charging preferential treatment of Chi
nese

Americans ,

discussed b elow,

confusion

about the

interminority issues abounds. The legal claims, racialized rhetoric,
and intergroup exchanges, communicated largely through legal fil

ings, news media, and word of mouth, form an interracial morass.

Amid this morass, communities of color undermine one another
with often thinly veiled insults and proposed settlements that at
65. See supra note 30.
66. See Paul Feldman, Major Portions of Prop. 187 Thrown Out by Federal Judge, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1995, at Al. There are exceptions to nonengagement One professor writes
a widely read weekly political column for Asianweek. Another testified before a congres
sional committee against English Only legislation. Others work with community immigration
organizations, legal services groups opposing anti-immigrant legislation, and international
human rights groups. Others assist environmental justice clinics or participate as litigation
consultants concerning housing, employment and indigenous peoples' rights. However, it is
my perception, and generally that of those interviewed, see supra note 41, that direct schol
arly participation and engagement in frontline antisubordination practice is the exception
rather than the rule. One recent race controversy that has galvanized race scholars involves
the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (ruling Univer
sity of Texas Law School's race-based affirmative action program unconstitutional despite a
long history of intentional racial exclusion at the university and law school). Professors at the
first LatCrit Conference in May, 1996, and professor members of the Society of American
Law Teachers (SALT) are organizing a variety of legal and political responses to Hopwood.
See Correspondence among board members of SALT (on file with author); Interview with
Professor Francisco Valdes in San Francisco, cal. (May 6, 1996). It is noteworthy that at least
during the early stages of this scholarly effort the litigation attorneys opposing the plaintiffs
in Hopwood appeared to be at most mildly interested in coordinating efforts with progressive
scholars. See also Gabriel Chin et al., Beyond Self-Interest: Asian Americans Toward a Com
munity ofJustice, 4 UCLA AsrAN PAC. AM. LJ. (forthcoming 1997) (arguments for affirma
tive action addressed primarily to political activists and the public).
67. Frank Wu, Reclaiming Relevance, AsIANWEEK, June 7, 1996, at 11 (reporting on com
mentary at the 1996 Asian American Studies Conference in Washington D.C.).
68. See Memorandum Decision and Order, supra note 2.
69. See Third Amended Complaint for Monetary, Declaratory, and Injunctive Relief,
United Minorities Against Discrimination v. City and County of San Francisco, No. C-912350 (N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 9, 1994) [hereinafter Third Amended Complaint].

838

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:821

best paper over unresolved tensions and satisfy no one.70 Group
wounds, lying just beneath the surface of daily interactions, and
larger intergroup power dynamics go unaddressed.71 The critical
theoretical work of race scholars offers political lawyers and com
munity leaders insight into the complex race, law, and power dy
namics underlying the controversies.72 The lawyers and leaders
offer race scholars both fertile ground for theory development and
opportunities for antisubordination practice. Yet the scholars, law
yers, and community organizations fail to mix in meaningful ways.
Empirical studies on antisubordination lawyering practice high
light the significance of this missed opportunity. The studies ad
dress the connections between political power, court issue agendas,
and "the role of law and courts as promoters of change. "73 More
specifically, the studies examine "nondecisions" - the way in
which demands for social structural change by disadvantaged
groups "can be suffocated before they are even voiced . . . or killed
before they gain access to the relevant decision-making arena" by
established legal and political interests in the local community.74
The studies find the integration of community activism with polit
ical lawyering efforts essential to an effective countering of estab
lished interests. Without a strong alliance between political lawyers
and community groups articulating coherent, substantive counter
messages and showing political support, court agendas reflect "the
prevailing distribution of power in the external environment" in
forms "least threatening to powerful interests."75
What scholar-theorists bring to the community-lawyer alliance
are critical socio-legal analyses, specific counter-messages, and
larger intellectual frameworks for justifying not only legal results
70. See Cany Kit Har Chan, Equitable Admissions: SF Board Revisits a Contentions Ad·
mission Policy, AsIANWEEK, Jan. 26, 1996, at 11 (describing school superintendents' roughly
conceived "equality and equity" settlement proposal).
71. See infra Part IV for discussion of specifics.
72. Some of these issues include the manner in which racial categories are fanned and
acquire social meaning; the ways in which law inscribes and reproduces racialized images and
maintains hierarchies among groups; and the ways in which affinnative action discourse by
Asian Americans in the past has been appropriated by neoconservative whites. See infra
section II.A for further discussion.
73. Mark Kessler, Legal Mobilization for Social Reform: Power and the Politics of
Agenda Setting, 24 LAw & SoCY. REv. 121, 126 (1990) (integrating social science studies on
the subject).
74. l'E'IER BACHRACH & MORTON S. BARATZ, POWER
PRACTICE 44 (1970).

AND

POVERTY: THEORY AND

75. Kessler, supra note 73, at 139; see also GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HoLLow HOPE:
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANoE? (1991).
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but also social structural changes.76 Theorists help connect how we
think and talk to how we act - a connection at the core of political
mobilization. The intellectual fuel for neoconservative activists and
politicians provided by scholars at think tanks is evidence of this
connection.77 The disconnection among progressive race scholars,
political lawyers, and community activists is an opportunity missed
by those struggling separately against neoconservative race praxis.1s
Broadly speaking, then, antisubordination practice in post-civil
rights America is limited in part by a disjuncture between emergent
progressive race theory and frontline civil rights-political lawyering
practice. Progressive race scholars, political lawyers, and commu
nity activists are rethinking racial justice and struggling toward a
common antisubordination goal without coalescing on present-day
understandings of, and strategies for, antisubordination practice.
As discussed in the next Part, antisubordination practice is further
limited by an intensifying dissociation of law from racial justice.
II.

THE

DISSOCIATION OF LAW FROM RACIAL JUSTICE

Sociologists find in post-civil rights America two nations di
vided, separate, hostile, and unequal,79 alongside society's "retreat
from racial justice."80 Their findings illuminate both wide dispari
ties in socio-economic conditions between white and nonwhite ra
cial groupss1 and American society's "retreat" from a commitment
76. See Ruth Margaret Buchanan, Context, Continuity, and Difference in Poverty Law
Scholarship, 48 U. MIAMI L. REv. 999 (1994) (describing ways in which poverty lawyering
discourses powerfully shape poverty lawyering practice); Margaret M. Russell, Entering
Great America: Reflections on Race and the Convergence of Progressive Legal Theory and
Practice, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 749 (1992) (calling for the integration of critical legal theory and
lawyering for social change); see also infra note 254 (concerning integration of feminist legal

theory with progressive gender practice).

77. See supra note 40.
78. That opportunity missed spurred the keynote speaker at a recent racial justice confer

ence to comment that conferences and scholarship are important, "[b]ut law professors . . .
must do more" to engage in "fighting the legal and political battles necessary to effect
change." Conference, Race, Law and Justice: The Rehnquist Court and the American Di
lemma, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 567, 644 (1996) (from the keynote address by Angela Jordan
Davis).

79. See ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE,
UNEQUAL at ix (1995).
80. S'IEINBERG, supra note 37, at 213.
81. See HACKER, supra note 79. Hacker utilizes statistical studies to illustrate widespread
socio-economic inequalities between whites and blacks. According to a 1993 Bureau of the
Census study, 46.3% of African American children are living below the poverty line, com
pared to 12.3% of white children. See id. at 105. Between 1970 and 1992, black family in
comes dropped from $613 to $544 for every $1000 received by white families. See id. at 103.
A 1994 study by the Bureau of Labor Statistics shows that unemployment rates for blacks
have not fallen below twice the white unemployment rate since 1976. See id. at 108. Jennifer
Hochschild describes an expansion of the black middle class and its continued disenchant-
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to overcome those disparities.82 I build upon, but do not repeat,
those accounts of racial conditions. I focus in this Part on one as
pect of the retreat from racial justice: the dissociation of law (as it
conceives of justice) from racial justice (as it is experienced by
racialized groups). I highlight three dimensions of this dissociation:
first, the law's linkage to racial injustice, or, more specifically, the
connection of law and cultural representations to legalized racial
oppression; second, antidiscrimination law's failure to address cul
tural discrimination and institutional racism in ways meaningful to
racial minorities and its endorsement of "reverse discrimination"
claims; and third, the failure of the bipolar white-black jurispruden
tial paradigm to handle increasingly complex conflicts and justice
claims among communities of color.
A.

Law, Cultural Representations, and Racial Oppression

The United States bears a harsh history of legalized racial op
pression. Since the country's inception, law has directly mandated
and indirectly supported racial discrimination, degradation, and vi
olence. From the late 1700s through the 1950s, racial minorities
faced a plethora of overtly hostile constitutional, legislative enact
ments, judicial rulings, and bureaucratic actions. The Constitution's
framers refused to recognize blacks as full citizens and thereby
sanctioned slavery.s3 The first Congress denied nonwhites the opment with the "American dream" due to continuing exposure to racism, alongside persistent
impoverishment of the black underclass. See JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, FACING UP TO THE
AMERICAN DREAM: RACE, CLASS, AND THE SOUL OF THE NATION (1995); see also Paul
Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 855, 881, 886
(1995) (describing a Census study showing Native American poverty rate to be three times
the white rate and Latino poverty rate ranging from two to three times the rate for whites);
Clarence Johnson, Racial Gap in Sentences is Growing: New Figures Show Blacks Jailed
More, S.F. CHRoN., Feb. 13, 1996, at Al (reporting on a study showing that African Ameri
can men in California between the ages of twenty and twenty-nine are imprisoned, on parole,
or on probation at a rate nearly eight times higher than whites); Poverty Among U.S. Asians
Despite Their Affluent Image, S.F. CHRoN., May 19, 1994, at A2 (citing a study by LEAP
Asian Pacific American Public Policy Institute and the U.C.L.A. Asian American Studies
Center showing the Asian American poverty rate to be 50% higher than the rate for whites).
82. See STEINBERG, supra note 37. Steinberg describes the ways in which political re
trenchment over the last twenty years has spawned a "scholarship of backlash." He identifies
scholars throughout the political spectrum as fueling this backlash, including the far right
(attributing socio-economic differences to racial group differences in intelligence), neocon
servatives (focusing on perceived cultural inadequacies of the black family rather than struc
tural inequality), left-liberals (emphasizing self-perpetuating pathologies of the African
American community) and black neoconservatives (dismissing affirmative action due to its
delegitimization of black achievements and reinforcement of black inferiority). This schol
arly backlash, which supports political efforts to eliminate welfare and dismantle affirmative
action, comes at a time of expanding socio-economic differences between whites and blacks.
See also Bert Eljera, Bilingual Voting Under Attack, AsIANWEEK, May 31, 1996, at 8 (describ
ing Congressional Republican assault on bilingual voting ballots).
83. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
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portunity of naturalized citizenship.84 Congress later sanctioned
the "removal" of Native Americans, annexed the sovereign nation
of Hawai'i, and excluded Chinese and Japanese immigrants as
threats to the economy and public morals.85 State legislatures au
thorized slavery, Jim Crow segregation, the anti-Mexican "Greaser
Act," and bans on interracial marriage.86 Local law enforcement
officers turned a blind eye to the lynching of blacks and Asians.s1
Governmental bureaucrats prohibited nonwhites from voting and
participating in politics and government service.88 The California
Supreme Court in People v. Hall found the Chinese to be such a
"degraded and demoralized caste" as to preclude their testimony
against whites.89 The United States Supreme Court in Dred Scott
declared blacks so inferior in all human respects as to be unworthy
of citizenship.9o Plessy v. Fergv.son91 declared the equality principle
of separate-but-equal, thereby relegating blacks to the back of the
bus and the bottom of the racial hierarchy, and Korematsu v. United
States92 upheld the constitutionality of the World War Two intern
ment of Japanese Affiericans without reliable proof of military
necessity.93
The in-your-face hostility of these laws and governmental ac
tions is common knowledge. What is less well known are the subtle
ways in which racial minorities sometimes experience law's injustice
- the ways in which law and cultural representations combine to
legitimate racial oppression. Law is more than courts, lawyers, and
legal rules. It is an integral part of political-cultural processes that
84. See Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795) (restricting ad
mission into the American community to "free white person[s]"). See generally GARY
0KIHIRO, MAR.GINS AND MAINSTREAMS: ASIANS IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND CULTURE
(1994).
85. See Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943); Immigration (Japa
nese Exclusion) Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (repealed 1952).
86. See DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (3d ed. 1992) [hereinaf
ter BELL, RACE); CARL GUTIERREZ-JONES, RETHINKING THE BORDERLANDS: BETWEEN
CHICANO CULTURE AND LEGAL DISCOURSE (1995).
Erl. See BELL, RACE, supra note 86. at 289-90 (stating that post-reconstruction civil rights
law failed blacks not only because it was inadequate but because white officials refused to
enforce it when blacks most needed legal protection from physical violence).
88. See id.
89. People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 403 (1854).
90. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
91. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
92. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
93. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited - Correcting the Injustice of Extraordi
nary Government Excess and Lax Judicial Review: Tune for a Better Accommodation ofNa
tional Security and Civil Liberties, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1 (1986) [hereinafter
Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited].
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generate "structures of meaning that radiate throughout social life
and serve as part of the material people use to negotiate their un
derstanding of everyday events and relationships."94 Disparaging
cultural representations are produced and reproduced through a va
riety of communicative channels, including law. In terms of con
straints on self-definition, law has played a powerful role in
imposing identities on racialized minorities as a way of excluding
them from full participation in American life.9s In terms of con
straints on self-development, law has facilitated the destruction of
cultural foundations for racial group survival.96
Law's inscription and reproduction of cultural images, which
create meaning that "radiates throughout social life," are captured
in Arnold Krupat's description of the role of law in the racialization
and then "removal" of Indians from eastern America.97 Indian re
moval, and the destruction of Indian societies, "could finally be
written into law and enforced . . . because by that time, a certain
story about America and about 'civilization' had become suffi
ciently acceptable [through journalism and literature] that it could
be used as ideological justification for 'certain sequences of causes
and effects,' for expansion with honor."98 Dominant white govern
ment and business powers took prevalent narratives about Indian
cultural difference, racial inferiority, and the righteousness of
American expansion and inscribed them in a legal text, the Indian
94. David M. Trubek, The Handmaiden's Revenge: On Reading and Using the Newer
Sociology of Civil Procedure, 51 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBs., Autumn 1988, at 111, 124 (1988).
95. According to pseudo-science, people with any African blood, even one drop, were of
inferior racial stock and cultural heritage and were therefore appropriately subject to Jim
Crow laws prohibiting voting, intermarriage, and first-class schooling, among other things.
See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Doe v. State of Louisiana, 479 So. 2d 369 (1985).
According to cultural criteria and "common sense," the courts determined who was "white"
and therefore entitled to the benefits of citizenship (Armenians in In re Halladjian, 114 F. 834
(C.C.D. Mass. 1909)) and who was not (Japanese in Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178
(1922}, Chinese in Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927), and Asian Indians in United States v.
Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923)). According to blood quantum, Congress determined which
Hawaiians would be eligible to receive Homelands parcels (50% or more, labeled "native
Hawaiians") and which would not (less than 50%, labeled "Hawaiians"). See Hawaiian
Homes Commission Act, 1920, ch. 42 Stat. 108, reprinted in 1 HAw. REv. STAT. 167-205
(Supp. 1989).
96. See Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minor
ities, 67 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 615 (1992) (describing dominant society's historical treatment
of outsiders in terms of assimilation, exclusion, or negation).
97. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 40 (describing racialization as political and social
processes that ascribe racial meanings to groups or events).
98. See ARNOLD KRUPAT, ETHNOCRITICISM: ETHNOGRAPHY, HISTORY, LITERATURE 133
(1992) (examining early Native American federal court cases and the submerged voices of
Native American leaders) (quoting ROBERT BERKHOFER, THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN!
IMAGES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN FROM COLUMBUS TO THE PRESENT 145ff (1979) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).

February 1997]

Critical Race Praxis

843

Removal Act. Those narratives legitimated not only the creation of
the text but also its coercive enforcement. As if by cloning, the
Reagan-appointed Presidential Commission on Indian Reservation
Economies later employed nearly identical racialized rhetoric and
issued a culturally derogatory report justifying the harsh conse
quences of decreasing "tribal dependence on federal monies. "99
Like the cultural derogation of African Americans, which was
used to justify Jim Crow laws, and the similar denigration of Japa
nese Americans, which was used to justify mass internment during
World War Two,100 the negation of Native Americans conjoined de
humanizing cultural representations of the racial "other" with legal
sanctions.
I am talking not about . . . cold-blooded atrocities but about law and
the ways in which [cultural] genocidal objectives have been carried
out under color of law . . . "legally, philanthropically, without shed
ding blood, and without violating a single great principle of morality
in the eyes of the world." These were legally enacted policies
whereby a way of life, a culture, was deliberately obliterated.101
As Krupat again observes, laws are not merely public texts but
"publicly sanctioned texts," and "their language does not merely ex
press or represent but effectually permits, prohibits, or requires par
ticular acts." Legal texts thus not only persuade, they coerce. They
are "enforced by' the full power of the state."102 What Krupat and
others describe is the oppressive way law sometimes operates as a
discursive strategy backed by force. It starts with the assessments
of cultural difference and the marking of inferiority upon the racial
ized minority. It then inscribes an inferior identity into a legal text
- defining Indians as wards of the government - that then legiti
mates p aternalism - requiring Indian acceptance of the

99. See Robert A. Wtlliams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of
European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31
Aruz. L. REV. 237, 266 (1989) (quoting REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE l'REsIDEN
TIAL COMMISSION ON INDIAN REsERVATION ECONOMIES, at pt. J, 7 (1984}}.
100. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (invoking cultural stereotypes
to infer Japanese American disloyalty); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (re
lying on Hirabayashi in sustaining military's conclusion of potential Japanese American
threat justifying mass exclusion and internment); BELL, RACE, supra note 86 (describing the
use of cultural derogation of African Americans to justify harsh legal treatment); see also
Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited, supra note 93.
101. Rennard Strickland, Genocide-at-law: An Historic and Contemporary View of the
Native American Experience, 34 KAN. L. REv. 713, 719 (1986) (quoting 1 ALEXIS DE Toe
QUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 355 (H. Reeve trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1945) (1836)).
102. See KRUPAT, supra note 98, at 130.
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subordinated identity of "dependent sovereign" - or negation removal.103

In this manner, law operates as a "cultural system that struc
tures relationships throughout society, not just those that come
before courts. "104 As a cultural system, law sometimes inscribes
and reproduces liberatory ideas and group images. Often, however,
it reflects dominant interests and fosters structural "oppression less
by coercion than by offering people identities contingent upon their
acceptance of oppression as defining characteristics of their very
selves."105 Law is experienced in this fashion by racial minorities as
injustice, not because of any particular hostile legislative enactment
or court ruling,
legitimates.
B.

but

because

of the

systemic

oppression

it

Limits of Antidiscrimination Law

Justice, or perceptions of justice, is also tied to law. Both polit
ical and popular culture refer to the legal system as "the system of
justice." Americans think of substantive justice as what juries find
and judges declare, and procedural justice as fairness in the process
of adjudication.106
Many Americans still think of racial justice in terms of law more specifically, in terms of government and private enforcement
of antidiscrimination constitutional provisions and statutes designed
to proscribe white discrimination against blacks. The Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution,107 the Civil Rights
Acts of 1877 and 1964,108 the Voting Rights Acts,109 the Fair Hous
ing Act,110

Brown v. Board of Education,111 Shelley v. Kraemer,112

103. See ALBERT MEMMI, THE COLONIZER
trans., 1965) (describing racism in these terms).

AND THE COLONIZED (Howard Greenfeld

Beyond Criticism, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 888, 889 (1988).
Id.
106. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JusrrCE (1988); Laurens Walker et al., The Relation Between Procedural and Distributive
Justice, 65 VA. L. REv. 1401 (1979).
107. U.S. CoNST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
108. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27; Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
104. Guyora Binder,
105.

§§ 2000a-2000h (1994).

109. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42
110. Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42
known as Title Vlll).

U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb (1965).
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1979 & Supp. IV 1981) (also

111. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy and rejecting separate-but-equal formulation
of equality for African Americans).
1 12. 334 U.S. 1 {1948) {holding racially restrictive covenant in land deed
unconstitutional).
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and Loving v. Virginia, 113 among other things, form an edifice of
modem antidiscrimination law. The African American civil rights
movement of the 1950s and 1960s placed antidiscrimination law at
the center of its political and moral strategies,114 and in some im
portant respects those strategies succeeded. Over time, antidis
crimination laws compelled the state and federal governments to
bring their considerable powers to bear in prohibiting intentional
race discrimination in the public rea1 m.11s Overt racism by whites
against blacks was, and continues to be, largely delegitimized by
this law-centered, intentionalist approach to racial justice. Many
people, including racial minorities, celebrate this approach and lift
it up as a model for democratic societies.116
For others, however, antidiscrimination law and the civil rights
paradigm are sharply limited. Over the last fifteen years, court de
cisions interpreting and applying antidiscrimination laws, primarily
in white-on-black settings, have tended to define racial justice in
crabbed and inverted ways.117 Those decisions and recent proce
dural reforms conceive of and administer justice in ways that clash
113. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding state antimiscegenation laws unconstitutional).
114. See generally ARON, supra note 47 (describing civil rights attorneys' reliance on liti
gation to further the interests of underrepresented groups); GREENBERG, supra note 54
(describing the role of NAACP Legal Defense Fund's lawyers in the movement toward racial
justice through law); Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive
Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HAR.v. L. REv. 985 (1990) (describing law as
part of the political and moral strategies of the civil rights movement).

115. See generally BELL, RACE, supra note 86

(describing antidiscrimination legislation

and its effect on race discrimination).

116. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Friend, Foe or Something Else: Social Meanings of Redress
and Reparations, 20 DEN. J. INTI.. L. & POLY. 223 (1992) (critiquing those who hold up
American civil rights laws as a model for democratic societies).

117. Constitutional equal protection and Title VII analyses tend to narrowly define racial
discrimination as unequal treatment on the basis of "skin color," to focus on intentional
wrongdoing, and to see racial harm as suffered by individuals rather than groups. See AN
GELA HARRIS, WHAT WE TALK ABoUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT RACE (forthcoming 1997)
[hereinafter HARRIS, TALK ABOUT RAcE]. Culture-based discrimination and acts of uncon
scious racism by governmental and private sector actors are ignored. See id. Discrimination
that is systemically maintained in business, education, and housing lies beyond antidis
crimination law's reach. See Charles Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) [hereinafter Lawrence,
Unconscious Racism]. Moreover, the legal requirement of direct causation - proof that the
wrongful act directly resulted in specific, redressable harm - undermines most historically
rooted group claims for justice. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871
(1990). Even when actionable discrimination is proven, race conscious remedies are nar
rowly drawn by balancing the interests of harmed racial group members and "innocent"
whites. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (holding that nonparties to consent decree
may bring collateral challenges). With these interests in mind, the Court's de facto embrace
of colorblindness permits white claims of "reverse discrimination." See Bush v. Vera, 116 S.
Ct. 1941 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996) [hereinafter Shaw Il]; Adarand Con
structors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) [hereinafter
Shaw 1]; City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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with the ideals, perceptions, and concrete experiences of many
members of racial communities, thereby dissociating law (not com
pletely, but significantly) from racial justice.11s
While political lawyers struggle to cope with the practical ramifi
cations of this dissociation - constricted substantive claims, inhos
pitable procedures, impatient j udges, frustrated clients progressive race scholars critically search for explanations .. Five ex
planations developed by theorists warrant brief mention. The first
is that even the Court's "progressive" antidiscrimination rulings re
flect majoritarian interests. From this view, law and legal process
tend primarily to preserve the social and political status quo,119 and
thus antidiscrimination law generates illusions of systemic reorder
ing and long-term racial justice. Society perceives the declaration
and occasional enforcement of intentionalist antidiscrimination
laws as justice done.120 This perception enables society's majority
to believe in equality while ignoring the limitations of legal justice
and the persistence of institutional racism.
Citing Brown v. Board of Education121 and advancing an inter
est-convergence thesis, Derrick Bell argues that under law, material
118. See SPANN, supra note 56 (describing conservative substantive rulings by the
Supreme Court). Jn addition to substantive rulings, procedural reforms diminish court ac
cess, particularly for those on society's margins. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat
to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 341 (1990)
[hereinafter Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat]. Moreover, even when "disadvantaged groups
[have] access to authoritative decisionmakers," unless effectively countered, dominant legal
and political interests in the local community implicitly threaten political lawyers and employ
judicial procedures to transform broad group or class issues into individualized disputes "in
forms that are least threatening to powerful interests." Kessler, supra note 73, at 139. Kess
ler's study identified "five major mechanisms sustaining [dominant] legal community norms
against litigating reform issues." Id. at 132. Those included the imposition of sanctions, the
explicit threat of sanctions, criticism about professionalism that carried implicit threats about
future opportunities, and the application of "negative labels." See id. The study found that
the one instance in which conservative interests (bar association, judiciary) were ineffective
in deploying those mechanisms involved an urban legal services organization that allied itself
with many well-organized community groups with political connections. See id. at 136.
119. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, FAILED REVOLUTIONS, supra note 57 (describing how
the methods and structure of legal justice operate to preserve unequal status quo social ar
rangements while persuading society, including traditional civil rights lawyers, of continuing
social progress). Related critiques of law and legal process have been made since the tum of
the last century. Those critiques in varying ways challenge the presumed neutrality and ob
jectivity of legal rules in their formulation, interpretation, and application; interrogate legal
methods in terms of power; and value and examine the operation and social effects of the
legal system. See generally KARL LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND
PRACI1CE 11 (1960) (legal realism); Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, and the
State, Toward a Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983) (feminist legal theory); Gary
Peller, The Metaphysics ofAmerican Law, 13 CAL. L. REV. 1151 (1985) (critical legal stud
ies); Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. L. REV.
489 (1912) (sociological jurisprudence); infra Part III (critical race theory).
120. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BorroM OF THE WELL (1992).
121. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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progress for racial minorities is allowed by law creators and deci
sionmakers only to the extent that the progress also furthers the
political and economic interests of predominantly white institu
tions.122 Interest-convergence explains why some racial minorities
perceive that the "legal establishment has not responded to civil
rights claims that threaten the superior societal status of upper and
middle class whites."123 From this perspective, rather than protect
ing the liberties and interests of minorities, the Court has tended to
reflect conservative majoritarian values and political preferences.124
A second explanation is courts' increasingly narrow understand
ing of what race, and therefore racial discrimination, is. For a ma
jority of the current Supreme Court, race is skin color. Race is thus
seen as an immutable, biologically determined trait. Racism, in
turn, is the "belief, held by too many for too much of our history,
that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin"125 prejudice about something beyond anyone's control and irrelevant
to human interactions. In short, color discrimination is wrong; an
tidiscrimination law prohibits it. By contrast, culture - language,
accent, customs - is seen as changeable, socially created, and vol
untarily adopted. It is seen as separate from race. Culture discrimi122. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1980) [hereinafter Bell, Interest Convergence]. Brown, the
historic desegregation case, is widely acclaimed as a civil rights victory for African Ameri
cans. Bell perceives the Court's decision to have been primarily motivated by concern about
the United States' standing to fight the Cold War against Soviet communism. See id. at 524;
BELL, RACE, supra note 86. The United States could not promote democracy internationally
if apartheid continued in America. The Court therefore renounced its own separate-but
equal framing of the principle of equality. For Bell, the Court stated a strong principle to
further its international interests , and then winked at domestic enforcement. The Court's
weak remedial mandate revealed its lack of commitment to ending racial subordination at
home. That mandate allowed states to maintain segregation provided they appeared to be
moving toward integration with "all deliberate speed." See Brown v. Board of Education,
349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (instructing state governments and federal courts to proceed to
remedy school segregation with "all deliberate speed."). That minimal antidiscrimination
mandate "engendered increasingly protracted battles with social and political forces that de
fiantly resisted court-ordered integration." Cheryl Harris, Whiteness As Property, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 1709, 1755 (1993); see also Mark Tushnet, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board
of Education, 91 CoLuM. L. REv. 1867, 1867 (1991) ("[The] Supreme Court endorsed a
formula of gradual desegregation that provided the opportunity for massive resistance in the
Deep South and for token desegregation elsewhere.").
123. Lawrence,

Unconscious Racism, supra note

117, at 122.

124. One observation about the Rehnquist Court is that it simply has undertaken correc
tives to perceived political imbalances, that the Court has responded to complaints that dis
crimination suits against whites and affirmative action for women and racial minorities have
divided the American polity and have unfairly disadvantaged those in the majority. If the
Court has undertaken these majoritarian "correctives," Girardeau Spann aptly observes,
then the traditional and still prevalent notion of the judiciary as the last bastion of protection
of minorities against intemperate majorities belies actual practice. See SPANN, supra note 56,
at 19, 129.
125.

Shaw I,

509 U.S. at 657.
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nation is not necessarily wrong and may even be rational;
antidiscrimination law allows it.

As discussed above, however, color and culture are inextricably
intertwined.126 When we talk about race in the United States we
are talking not just about skin color but also about the cultural
shape and content of our polity. Color and culture, intertwined,
influence who gets in (immigration), who participates politically
(electoral districting and multilingual ballots), who gets incarcer
ated (three strikes and you're out), what languages are spoken
(English Only legislation), what customs are allowed (housing ar
rangements, spiritual practices), how educational and job opportu
nities are parceled out (slotting according to "cultural traits"), and
how social services are delivered (medical care, welfare). Designa
tions of cultural difference are used effectively by some in dominant
power positions to justify excluding racialized groups from the pol
ity. As Angela Harris observes, limiting antidiscrimination law's
reach solely to color prejudice permits "discrimination against tra
·

ditionally subordinated groups, so long as it is recharacterized as
being based on 'culture' rather than 'race.' "127
A third explanation for the dissociation of antidiscrimination
law from racial justice concerns the law's internal methodological
constraints.128 Cass Sunstein locates one such constraint in the no
tion of "commensurability."129 Substantive and remedial legal doc
trine often treat as commensurable things that the people involved
would adjudge incommensurable. Law does this "in part by creat
ing categories that abstract away some of the very aspects of a given
dispute that . . . 'are of greatest significance to the parties them
selves.' "130 In a given dispute, what may be " 'incomparable,' and
therefore . . . irresolvable by a 'rational choice' . . . to the parties
themselves, may nevertheless be, from the perspective of the law,
resolved in a principled manner.''131 One consequence is a legal
See HAruus, TALK ABoUT RACE, supra note 117.
Id.
128. See generally Jack M. Beennann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special
Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1989) (critiquing the internal methodologi
cal failings of civil rights law).
129. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV.
779 (1994) .
130. David B. Wtlkins, Practical Wisdom for Practicing Lawyers: Separating Ideals from
Ideology in Legal Ethics, 108 HARV. L. REv. 458, 471 (1994) (reviewing and quoting
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER! FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
57 (1993) (critiquing Sunstein's view of cornrnensurability in law)); see also Steven Winter,
Indeterminacy and lncommensurability in Constitutional Law, 18 CAL. L. REV. 1441 (1990).
131. Wilkins, supra note 130, at 471; see also ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAW·
YER! FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 17-23 (1993) .
126.

127.
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system designed to resolve disputes in a principled manner, the re
sults of which, by definition, constitute justice. Another conse
quence is that what this system defines as just and rational, based
on the principle of commensurability, may be experienced in the
material world as unjust and irrational by those directly affected.
An expansive notion of commensurability in cases of intentional
institutional racism, for example, limits the range of meaningful
remedies. It deems commensurate the harm of intentional institu
tional racial harassment and a specified amount of money, even
though a monetary award may not redress human indignity, alter
relationships, or restructure offending institutions132-a principled
rendering of legal justice often deemed unjust by those suffering the
racial harm.
A fourth explanation involves a procedural realism attentive to
questions of power and value. I have written elsewhere about how
recent efficiency reforms in the law's adjudicatory procedures and
the narrowing of remedial options tend to diminish court access for
those already at society's margins, especially racial and other mi
norities asserting novel claims or theories that challenge existing so
cial and p olitical arrangements.133 Critical s ociological
proceduralists observe ways in which procedural rules and systems,
in formulation, interpretation, and application, often reflect so
called substantive value choices.134 The collapse of the clean sub
stance-procedure dichotomy implicates power allocation and polit
ical value judgments in the framing and handling of adjudicatory
process.135 These theoretical observations are buttressed by empiri132. Courts generally are reluctant to grant injunctive relief if monetary damages are
awardable. llA CHARI.Es ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2944 (2d ed. 1995). Because monetary damages are awardable for most wrongs under the
notion of commensurability, injunctive and other forms of equitable relief are often
disallowed.
133.

See Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat, supra note

118.

See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909 (1987); Carl Tobias,
The Transformation of Trans-Substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1501 (1992); Trubek,
supra note 94; Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat, supra note 118; Stephen B. Burbank, The
Costs of Complexity, 85 MicH. L. REv. 1463 (1987) (reviewing RICHARD L. MARCUS & ED
WARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LmGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED ClvIL
PROCEDURE (1995)); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Metaprocedure, 98 YALE L.J. 945 (1989) (re
viewing ROBERT M. COVER ET AL., PROCEDURE (1988)); Bryant G. Garth, Privatization and
the New Formalism: Making the Courts Safe for Bureaucracy, 1988 LAW & Soc. INQ. 157
134.

(1988) (reviewing RICHARD
(1985)).

A.

POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM

135. See generally Eric K. Yamamoto & Joseph L. Dwight IV, Procedural Politics and
Federal Rule 26: Opting-Out of "Mandatory" Disclosure, 16 U. HAw. L. REV. 167 (1994).
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cal studies of court access for disadvantaged groups seeking social
structural change through law. The studies identify

the ways in which dominant interests exclude from government [jus
tice] agenda issues that threaten the status quo [by the use of] . . . "a
set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional proce
dures ('rules of the game') that operate systematically and consist
ently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of
others."136
As procedural justice research confirms, these kinds of racial mi
nority experiences with legal process, the system's procedures and
methods, are likely to influence strongly minorities' overall percep
tions of the limitations of legal justice.131
A final explanation for the limits of antidiscrimination law for
racial minorities locates critiques of majoritarian influence, race
definitions, internal methodology, and procedural reform in a spe
cific political context. The Reagan-Bush federal judiciary, ap
pointed in the 1980s, reflects a conservative race ideology.13s More
than furthering majoritarian interests, the courts' recent rulings re
veal antiracial minority sentiments. This is not surprising given that
President Reagan's Attorney General, Edwin Meese, made polit
ical conservatism on race issues, among others, a precondition of
appointment to the bench.139 In the mid-1990s, for instance, the
Court effectively dismantled federal race-based affirmative action
programs,140 invalidated on equal protection grounds voter redis
tricting plans (African American- and Latino-majority districts) in
North Carolina and Texas,141 and ended, in practical effect, a school
136. Kessler, supra note 73, at 125 (quoting BACHRACH & BARATZ, supra note 74, at 43).
137.
justice).

See LIND & TYLER, supra note 106, at 61-92 (social psychology of procedural

138. Although the Court has exhibited centrist tendencies concerning gender, see United
States v. Virginia, 64 U.S.L.W. 4638 (1996); Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 510 U.S. 1309
(1994), and sexual orientation issues, see Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), the Court's
majority has consistently ruled conservatively in the realm of race. See infra text accompany
ing notes 188-200.
139. See HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING nm CouRTS: THE CoNSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN
TO REWRITE nm CoNSTITUTION (1988); Timothy B. Tomasi & Jess A. Velona, Note, All the

President's Men?: A Study of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts ofAppeals,
87 CoLUM. L. REv. 766 (1987); see generally Brian K. Landsberg, Race and the Rehnquist
Court, 66 TuL. L. REV. 1267 (1992).
140. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
141. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996); Shaw II, 116 S. a. 1894 (1996); Miller v.

Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). In attempts to comply with the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
North Carolina in Shaw II and Texas in Bush created irregularly shaped majority African
American and Hispanic congressional districts. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Shaw
appeared to recognize a new right to "colorblind" districting. Justice Stevens in his dissent
argued that the Court's decision to entertain the plaintiffs' claim emanated "less from the
Equal Protection Clause's bar against racial discrimination than from the Court's unarticu
lated recognition of a new substantive due process right to 'color-blind' districting itself."
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racial desegregation effort.142 In several of these cases the Court's
majority embraced a form of constitutional colorblindness to pro
tect whites against affirmative governmental actions favoring
nonwhites.

In sum, for many racial minorities, Bell's interest-convergence
thesis resonates: racial progress under law appears to be influenced
largely by the majoritarian interests of white Americans. Harris's
observation about the law's limiting conception of racial discrimina
tion as color prejudice illuminates: race-connected claims of culture
subordination are deemed nonjusticiable.

Sunstein's notion of

commensurability reveals dissonance: what the legal system defines
as racial justice according to abstract principles may not reflect the
perceptions and concrete experiences of racial communities. Proce
dural realism undercuts the notion of the inherent neutrality of
court procedures:

racial and other minorities are finding a re

formed procedural system increasingly inhospitable to their justice
grievances. Critical contextual analysis reveals conservative racial
policies embedded in law: a belief by decisionmakers that racial
minorities have gotten more than their fair share at the expense of
"innocent whites."
The limitations of antidiscrimination law, identified by theorists,
coalesce practically for many racial minorities in an experience of
law as often irrational, as a "retreat from racial justice."143 A re
cent survey for the California Judicial Council found that a majority
of African Americans and Latinos believe that the courts do not
ensure racial fairness.144 Professor and attorney Linda Krieger de
scribes her racial minority clients after "encounters with civil rights
enforcement" as "embittered," "frustrated and misunderstood. ';14s
For progressive race theorists and political lawyers, justice
through antidiscrimination law thus is a conundrum. Hope, promShaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1910. In both cases, the Court declared that an interest in ameliorating
past discrimination did not justify the use of race in the redistricting plans.
142.

See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).

143. STEINBERG, supra note 37. Steinberg's study addresses many aspects of American
society's "retreat" from racial justice, of which civil rights law enforcement is one. Cf.
George M. Fredrickson, Far From the Promised Land, N.Y. REv. OF Bom<s, Apr. 18, 1996, at
18-19 (criticizing Steinberg's apparent view that the only racial justice paths are either full
governmental intervention or racial minority self-help and that the former is the only choice
because the latter is precluded by systemic discrimination).
144. See Bert Eljera, APAs and the Law: Trial By Fire, AsIANWEEK, June 7, 1996, at 12,
14 (citing a 1992 study by the advisory panel to the California Judicial Council).
145. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Ap
proach to Discrimination and Equal Protection Employment Opportunity, 41 STAN. L. REv.
1161, 1164, 1166 (1995).
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ise, and change are its legacy,146 as are disillusionment, breach, and
stasis. My point is not that legal justice is impossible for racial mi
norities in post-civil rights America. Indeed, many continue to
lobby local legislatures and file discrimination lawsuits; some
achieve personal relief, and a few compel institutional reorder
ing.147 My point is that in concept and in current practice the civil
rights, antidiscrimination law approach to racial justice is sharply
constricted and that for many racial minorities this constriction un
dermines the notion of justice through legal process. It pulls law
away from racial justice.
C.

Limits of the White-on-Black Paradigm: Jurisprudential
Blindness to Color on Color

As America becomes a nation of many minorities rather than a nation
of black and white, the assumption that rights and especially remedies
crafted for a biracial society will fit a multiracial one becomes increas
ingly problematic.148
The preceding section described antidiscrimination law in the
context of white on black relations. As intimated by the epigraph
above, this legal framing of race controversies tends to dissociate
law from racial justice in another important respect. The prevailing
· white-black jurisprudential paradigm narrowly conceives race relations in post-civil rights America: white versus black, majority ver
sus minority, perpetrator versus victim.149 This conception is
limiting in two ways: It limits racial inquiry to white and black rela
tions, and its binary oppositional framing of race issues generates
an either-or view of racial justice. While white on black disputes
are of immense continuing import, the white-black casting of race
issues misses important complexities in multiracial America.
The inadequacy of the white-black paradigm is revealed in its
marginalization of issues of inter-minority-group, or interracial,
justice.150 The Supreme Court, as part of its antidiscrimination law,
146.

See supra notes 107-15 and infra note 147.

147. See, e.g., Vietnamese Fishermen's Assn. v. Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Tex.
1981) (enjoining Ku Klux Klan and white fishermen from harassing legal immigrant
Vietnamese fishermen). For a discussion of ways in which legal process and rights claims
contribute to group empowerment within broad political strategies, see infra Part IV.
148. HAruus , TALK ABOUT

RACE, supra note 117.

149. See Elizabeth Martinez, Beyond Black/White: The Racisms of Our Time, 20 Soc.
Jusr. 22 (1993); Eric K. Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances: Agency, Responsibility and Inter
racial Justice, 3 UCLA AsIAN PAc. AM. L.J. 33 (1995) [hereinafter Yamamoto, Rethinking

Alliances].

150. It also overlooks white relations with nonblack people of color. While this relation
ship is also jurisprudentially important, see, for example, Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S.
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has not addressed meaningfully the dynamics of conflict among ra
cial minorities, nor has it developed a framework for analyzing in
terminority justice claims.1s1 Similarly, until recently, legal scholars
largely have ignored this aspect of racial justice.152
While white on black and white on color relationships are inte
gral to every discussion of racial justice, color on color relationships
are also salient.153 Conflicts among racial minority groups, and at
tempts to forge alliances out of conflict, are increasingly preva
lent.154 The Asian American churches' resolution of apology and
redress to Native Hawaiians,155 the African American, Latino, and
Asian American coalitional efforts following the Rodney King po
lice trial firestorm in Los Angeles, and the Chinese American chal
lenge to affirmative action for blacks and Latinos in San Francisco's
public high schools in

Ho

are recent situations raising volatile,

highly publicized issues of interracial justice.
Social and political scientists, anthropologists, economists, eth
nic studies scholars, and peace scholars are pursuing the changing
dynamics of these kinds of intergroup conflicts in post-civil rights
America.156 Their diverse works offer two particularly compelling
352 (1991), in which a white attorney was permitted to use peremptory challenges to elimi
nate Hispanic jurors. I focus on interminority group, or interracial, relations.
I use the term "interracial" narrowly to mean interactions between members of two or
more nonwhite racial groups. In doing so I acknowledge the social construction of racial
categories, see 0MI & WINANT, supra note 40, and the significance of white as a racial cate
gory, see IAN F. HANEY LoPEZ, WlllTE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
(1996)). I define interracial justice in the following fashion:
Interracial justice
reflects a commitment to anti-subordination among nonwhite ra
cial groups. It entails in substance a hard acknowledgment of ways in which racial
groups have banned and continue to harm one another, sometimes through forms of
oppression, along with affirmative efforts to redress past banns with continuing effects.
Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances, supra note 149, at 34. I recognize that discussion of interra
cial justice, which addresses how nonwhite racial groups sometimes oppress one another, can
easily be taken out of context and misused.
[I]n light of current anti-affirmative action initiatives, the discussion can be misused to
absolve whites of responsibility for continuing structural subordination of racial groups
and to recast whites as primary "victims" of racism. . . . [The] discussion of interracial
conflict, even as a predicate to interracial healing, [also] can be misused simply to high
light divisions among racial groups.
Id. at 71.
151. See Natapoff, supra note 26.
152. See infra note 156 (describing recent legal scholarly treatment of interminority
conflict).
153. See Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances, supra note 149, at 34-39.
154. See infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
155. See Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances, supra note 149, at 39 (describing Asian Ameri
can churches' proposed apology to and reparations for Native Hawaiians as a result of Asian
American complicity in the cultural and economic subordination of Hawaiians following the
overthrow of the Hawaiian nation in 1893).
156. Within the United States, these scholars address conflicts between citizens and immi
grants tied to racial demographic shifts, economic changes, and nativistic responses, see BILL
. • .
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insights.157 The first is heuristic: Interminority group competition
and conflict can be studied and understood only by locating it
within the larger context of historical white domination and its con
tinuing effects. Contemporary interracial relations are framed, at
least in part, by the historical and present-day political, economic,
and social power of whites in America.158 The second, and related,
insight is descriptive: Relations among racial minority groups are
qualitatively different from relations between whites and blacks.
Due to each racial group's differing historical experiences with
white dominance, due to the dynamics of current "group position
ing" along a shifting, but nevertheless extant, racial hierarchy, and
due to cultural diversity and differing socio-economic conditions,

ONG HING, MAKING

AND

REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY

1850-1990, at 2, 9-10 (1993), present-day tensions and reparatory efforts involving America's
indigenous peoples and nonwhite groups, see WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZEN·
SHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995) (focusing on American and Cana

dian Indians) and, within a context of continuing white dominance, "group positioning"
along a "racialized" hierarchy involving Asian Americans, Latino Americans, African Amer
icans, and Native Americans. See ALMAGUER, supra note 6. Most notably, a variety of
socio-political works interrogate inner-city African American and Korean American cultural
misunderstandings, conflict, and violence - inquiries spurred in the early nineties by the
South Central Los Angeles firestorm, the "Red Apple" African American boycott of Korean
merchants in Brooklyn, the Ice Cube rap "Black Korea," and the Soon Ja Du shooting of
Latasha Harlins. See, e.g., Los Angeles - Struggles Toward Multiethnic Community, 19
AMERASIA J. (1993) (entire volume examining conflictual relations among African Ameri
cans, Asian Americans, and Latino Americans).

157. These works suggest a range of explanations for interracial conflict in post-civil
rights America. Sociological explanations tend to focus on assimilation (the difficulties ex
perienced by newcomers in terms of a pattern of contact, conflict, accommodation, and fi
nally, integration) or on socio-economic dislocation (the involuntary movement of social
groups, and particularly African Americans, as a result of Latino and Asian immigration and
a restructured economy). See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE
INNER CITY, 1liE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 20 (1987); James H. Johnson, Jr. &
Melvin L. Oliver, Interethnic Minority Conflict in Urban America: The Effects of Economic
and Social Dislocations, in RACE AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 194 (Fred L. Pincus & Howard J.
Ehrlich eds., 1994). Economic analyses tend to describe race-class hierarchies with wealthy
and middle class whites at the top, poor African Americans and Native Americans at the
bottom, and working class whites and recent minority immigrants in the middle. These anal
yses discuss intergroup tensions in terms of labor competition among racial minorities, in
cluding "split labor markets" (the empirical reality of white workers generally aligning most
closely with white employers rather than nonwhite workers) and "middleman minorities"
(Korean American entrepreneurs serving as a buffer between predominantly white busi
nesses in control of production and distribution and poor inner-city African Americans). See,
e.g., IVAN LIGHT & EDNA BONACICH, IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS: KOREANS IN Los AN
GELES 1965-1982, at 17-20 (1988); George J. Borjas, Immigrants, Minorities, and Labor Mar
ket Competition, 40 INDus . & LAB. REL. REv. 382 (1987). Political scientists and ethnic
studies scholars also advance power-conflict theories, locating interracial tensions in differing
group political and economic power and in the competition for scarce private resources and
government entitlements. See Joe R. Feagin & Clairece Booher Feagin, Theoretical Perspec
tives in Race and Ethnic Relations, in RAcE AND ETHNIC CONFLICT, supra, at 29, 36-45.
158. See supra note 157.
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color on color differs significantly from white on color.1s9 Collec
tively, what emerges from these two insights specifically, and the
socio-political works generally, is this: theoretical and empirical re
search must expand not only beyond white on black but also be
yond white on color to encompass color on color.160
For this reason, Angela Harris, through rhetorical questions,
suggests expansion, or reorientation, of antidiscrimination law's
white on black paradigm.'

Should these groups [particularly Latinos and Asian Americans],
more internally diverse than African Americans, nevertheless receive
the same legal treatment as African Americans? Should the various
subgroups within these �'races" be treated identically despite very dif
ferent material circumstances. . . . [T]he emergence of "other minori
ties" as a powerful political and cultural force raises the issue of
"discrimination" among and between nonwhite groups. To what ex
tent should the law recognize such discrimination, and is it the same
as discrimination between whites and nonwhites?161
A pending African American employment discrimination suit
targeting Asian American managers reveals the complexity of those
questions in even "ordinary," minimally publicized, interracial jus
tice settings.
The United Minorities Against Discrimination, an unincorpo
rated community organization, five African Americans, and two
Latinos are suing the City and County of San Francisco and the
Civil Service Commission.162 The plaintiffs assert federal and state
civil rights claims of discrimination in the hiring and promotion of
African American and Latino personnel analysts. What distin
guishes this suit from many other discrimination suits by racial mi159. See ALMAGUER, supra note 6, at 208 (positioning along a racial hierarchy); DAVID
THEO GOLDBERG, RACIST CuLTURE 112-13 (1993); STEINBERG, supra note 37; CoRNEL
WEST, RAcE MATTERS 28-29 (1993); see also supra note 157.
160. Although illuminating, these insights are of limited utility for those entangled in
actual interracial controversies. They provide no guidance and little light for racial groups
endeavoring to struggle through intergroup competition and conflict and deal with interracial
justice claims. These socio-political works operate from a vantage point of outside looking
in. They overlay models of social organization onto broad categories of historical, economic,
and demographic information. The outside-in structural models tend to attribute all inter
group conflict and the actions of racial groups to large structural forces in society, thereby
ignoring, or writing out of existence, the agency of racial groups in the construction of inter
group relations. This denial of agency is troublesome because it rejects the potential for
group efforts to rearticulate identities, establish alliances, build coalitions, and participate
productively in political affairs. See generally Jo Carrilo, Surface and Depth: Some Method
ological Problems with Bringing Native American-Centered Histories to Light, 20 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 405 (1993); Steve J. Stem, Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World
System in the Perspective of Latin America and the Caribbean, 93 AM. HlsT. REV. 829 (1988).
161. HAruus , TALK ABOUT RACE, supra note 117.
162.

See Third Amended Complaint, supra note 69, at 105.
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norities is that the apparent discriminators and main beneficiaries
of the alleged discrimination are not white; they are Chinese Amer
icans. According to the allegations of the complaint, "Black and
Hispanic personnel analysts comprised between

29

and 44 percent

of the analyst pool" and, despite requests for promotion by quali
fied African Americans and Latinos between 1985 and 1990, none
was promoted.163 The complaint also alleges that the defendants
failed to follow established hiring and promotion procedures and
that "certain supervisors" made "disparaging remarks regarding
Blacks and Hispanics" with an intent to discriminate.164
Interestingly, the complaint does not state explicitly that Asian
Americans, or Chinese Americans, are the primary beneficiaries of
the asserted discrimination. In fact, the complaint is silent as to the
races of the beneficiaries of the alleged discrimination, saying only
that they are "neither Black nor Hispanic."165 Nevertheless, by list
ing the names of the "less qualified" applicants who received the
positions or promotions, the complaint implicitly racialized its
claim. The names identified are predominantly Chinese American
- Wong, Wong, Lum, Gee, and (Mei-Long) Sam. 166 One is Ko
rean American (Ko) and two appear to be white (Heurlin and
McAllister).167 The complaint also does not list the names or races
of the city decisionmakers. Subsequent filings indirectly reveal that
key decisionmakers are white (four) and Chinese American (two)
and that the person assigned to conduct an internal investigation of

plaintiffs' charges is Chinese American.16s

Two salient features of the dispute, which are only hinted at in
the complaint, emerged in bits and pieces during discovery and
briefing on motions. One feature is the interracial dynamics be
tween the Asian American applicants, supervisors, and the investi
gator and the African American and Latino applicants. The other
feature is the reluctance of the parties and their attorneys to ac
knowledge, let alone directly address, these dynamics. Neither the
plaintiffs' complaint nor the parties' briefs on motions call attention
163. See Third Amended Complaint, supra note 69, at 9.
164. Third Amended Complaint, supra note 69, at 10.
165. See Third Amended Complaint, supra note 69, at 12, 22.
166. See Third Amended Complaint, supra note 69, at 12, 18, 21.
167. See Third Amended Complaint, supra note 69, at 12, 18, 22.
168. See Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts at 7, United Minorities
Against Discrimination v. City and County of San Francisco, No. C-91-2350 (filed Jan. 27,
1995) (apparent racial breakdown of decisionmakers for one plaintiff who were also involved
in other case decisions); Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief In Opposition to Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment at 7, United Minorities, No. C-91-2350 (filed May 15, 1995).
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to the color on color interplay. None of the legal filings questions
whether antidiscrimination law, originally conceived to handle .
white-versus-black, majority-versus-minority disputes, needs to be
reinterpreted. None of the filings or arguments discusses legal im
plications of the apparent racial hierarchy: white officials supervis
ing Chinese Americans and white managers accused of
discriminating against African Americans and Latinos in favor of
Chinese Americans and whites. None of the filings acknowledges
other high-profile San Francisco political-legal disputes, discussed
earlier, involving Chinese Americans, African Americans, and
Latinos.
Indeed, rather than acknowledging the volatile, socially signifi
cant interracial dynamics of the case, the parties' attorneys agreed
to "protect" against public disclosure the "racial designations" · of
the participants in the hiring and promotion process.169 Under
threat of contempt, no one can reveal city records on race matters
critical to full, context-sensitive understanding of the controversy.
Thus, by court-approved stipulation, the parties and attorneys are
concealing from public view what for many may be the heart of the
case - the African American, Latino, Chinese American, and
white intergroup dynamics within a specific social-historical setting.
The apparent racial hierarchy and interminority interplay, only
hinted at in the case filings and public documents, complicate plain
tiffs' antidiscrimination claims and, in important respects, lift them
out of the white-black jurisprudential paradigm. Chinese Ameri
cans historically suffered at the hands of whites in San Francisco. In
business, housing, and education the Chinese were denigrated and
discriminated against by law and social custom for more than one
hundred years after their arrival in the mid-1800s.170 Chinese
Americans today still face discriminatory treatment. Recent Chi
nese immigrants tend to fall below the poverty line and to struggle
finding adequate housing and jobs, particularly in the wake of Cali
fornia's Proposition 187.171 Young Asian males have been ran
domly photographed so that mug books can guide Bay Area police
169. See Stipulation and Protective Order at 2, United Minorities, No. C-91-2350 (filed
Mar. 29, 1994). The stipulated protective order provides, in relevant part, that certain docu
ments shall "not be exhibited or displayed, and the contents thereof shall not be disclosed."
Id. Those documents include "specified documents containing race designations." Id.
170. See ALMAGUER, supra note 6; HING, REMAKING AsIAN AMERICA, supra note 156, at
139.
171. See Pat Chew, Asian Americans: The 'Reticent' Minority and Their Paradoxes, 36
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 28-29 (1994); Jim Impoco, California Tries to Give Back the Tired
and Poor, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., Nov. 21, 1994, at 42.
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in their search for Asian youth gangs.172 In upscale Marin County,
an unemployed white male awoke one morning in 1995 and decided
to kill an Asian, any Asian. At a nearby store he stabbed in the
chest Eddy Wu, the first Asian person he saw.173 Many middle
class Chinese Americans perceive continuing discrimination, not
only by whites in terms of glass ceilings and sporadic hate violence,
but also by African Americans and Latinos through affirmative
action.174
Despite past and recent history, many Chinese Americans in
San Francisco are financially successful, Chinese American political
visibility is rising in the Bay Area, and Asian Americans generally
exceed their proportionate numbers at University of California
campuses.175 The newly appointed city chief of police and state
Supreme Court justice are Chinese American, as was the recent
Chancellor of the University of California at Berkeley.176 Indeed,
some African Americans perceive Asian Americans as a buffer be
tween whites and blacks, as the "racial bourgeoisie"177 or "middle
man minority"178 who, by their partially elevated position in the
racial hierarchy, undermine black charges of white supremacy while
nevertheless preserving white privilege and slowing black advance
ment. Some mid-level Asian American managers confirm that
charge, at least in part, through their complaint that they are used
by white superiors as the "pacifiers" and "shock absorbers."179
They perceive that they are directed to fire or make unrealistic de
mands of lower-level African Americans and Latinos while absorb172. See Cops Promise Action on Asian 'Mug Book,' S.F. CHRON., Aug. 2, 1992, at A24.
173. See Torri Minton, Quiet Marin Confronts Hate Crimes: National Study Sees Rise in
Violence Against Asians, S.F. CHRoN., Nov. 29, 1995, at A13.
174. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 9; see also Candy Kit Har Chan,
Equitable Admissions, AsIANWEEK, Jan. 26, 1996, at 11 (describing Chinese American belief
in the unfairness of San Francisco public school affirmative action for African Americans).
175. See Don T. Nakanishi, A Quota on Excellence? The Asian American Admissions
Debate, in ASIAN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE 273, 280 (Don T. Nakanishi & Tina
Yamano Nishida eds., 1995) (noting that "Asian Americans generally exceed their propor
tionate numbers" at University of California campuses).
176. See Bill Wong, Sweet and Sour, AsIANWEEK, Jan. 26, 1996, at 6 (describing the "cold
shower for S.F. euphoria" over the appointment of Chinese American Fred Lau, including
the "racially charged contretemps" following his appointment); Alethea Yip, Among the
Supremes: Judge Ming Chin Appointed to California Supreme Court, AsrANWEEK, Feb. 1996,
at 9.
177. Mari Matsuda, We Will Not Be Used, 1 AsrAN AM.

PAC.

ISLANDS L.J. 79 (1993).

178. See supra note 157.
179. Benjamin Pimentel, Asian Americans' Awkward Status: Some Feel Whites Use Them
As 'Racial Wedge' With Others, S.F. CHRoN., Aug. 22, 1995, at Al.
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ing the flack and insulating their employers from discrimination
claims by virtue of their own minority status.180
Do these complex interracial dynamics undergird the United
Minorities' (a seemingly ironic name choice) justice claims? If so,
why do those dynamics remain submerged in the litigation sub
strata? Why are underlying socio-political grievances among Asian
Americans, African Americans, and Latinos ignored? And why
does no one, litigants, attorneys, or the media, address white racism
in the city's institutional bureaucracy? One response to these ques
tions comes in the form of other questions concerning the parties'
attorneys. Why have plaintiffs' attorneys, a large, established San
Francisco firm, appeared to limit their efforts to a search for evi
dence of intentional discrimination? "Because that is all the civil
rights case law requires" is an apt answer. The focus on "inten
tional" discrimination, however, misses the important institutional
ized aspects of the actual hiring and promotion process. Why have
plaintiffs' attorneys cast the case within the narrow, binary white
black antidiscrimination law paradigm? "Because that is how an
tidiscrimination law is framed." The victim-perpetrator, good-bad;
either-or framing of the issues, however, belies the multilayered in
terminority dynamics of this and related justice controversies.
A review of the volumes of court filings in the suit starkly
reveals the limits of legal justice and traditional antisubordination
practice: The interracial dynamics that appear to be central to illu
mination and handling of the justice claims are nowhere to be seen
or heard. How do differing group histories, changing racial-eco
nomic demographics, and shifting group positions in a racial hierar
chy both complicate and ground analyses of the United Minorities
controversy? We do not know because no one is talking, and no
one is talking, it seems, because no one is inquiring. And no one is
inquiring, I suggest, because we have not yet developed the founda
tional concepts and language.
This then raises the larger inquiry: What languages do the law
and other disciplines employ to account for, or discount, intergroup
dynamics? In the realm of intergroup conflict, the language of com
munity leaders is often assertive, even vociferous. Organizers
speak to and about people in their communities in language rooted
in both concrete particularities and political strategy.181 Journalists
speak to a broader audience and often eagerly report on intergroup
180. See id.
181. See Samuel R. Cacas, Minority Lawyers Organize Against California Save Our State
Initiative, AsIANWEEK, Sept. 2, 1994, at 1; Ben Q. Limb, New York Launches Black-Korean
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tensions, sometimes with considerable sophistication.182 As men
tioned, socio-political scholars are interrogating multiple aspects of
intergroup conflict.
Compared to recent high-profile community and media com
mentaries and socio-political studies, courts, lawyers, and legal
scholars have spoken little about interracial conflict and justice
claims. In the United Minorities discrimination suit, for instance,
the judge, lawyers, and parties refuse to talk about - and legal
scholars have not weighed in on - what appears to be the heart of
the suit's justice claims: an apparent racial hierarchy in one part of
city government, with whites at the top and African Americans and
Latinos at the bottom, maintained by complicitous Asian Ameri
cans in the middle.183
Why the comparative silence? Is it in part because justice claims
are usually cast within a traditional civil rights white-black, major
ity-minority, individual perpetrator-individual victim jurispruden
tial paradigm? The attorneys and parties clearly cast United
Minorities within that paradigm.184 Is the silence also because
color-on-color is rendered inconsequential by the legal irrelevance
of color distinctions? Justice Sandra Day O'Connor recently im
plied as much in Shaw v. Reno, 185 a case in which the predomi
nantly white North Carolina legislature, at the urging of the U.S.
Attorney General and according to the dictates of the Voting
Rights Act, altered election district lines to create the state's second
black-majority voting district. Writing for the majority, O'Connor
observed that all governmental racial classifications should be
treated in the same skeptical legal fashion, regardless of whether
the classification is designed to end a white-controlled racial caste
system or to perpetuate it.186 O'Connor implied that races are fun
gible under the law, that all racial categories should be treated as
Mediation Project, NAPABA LAWYER, Oct. 1994, at 7; New Coalition Formed to Address
Racism in Southern California, RAFU SIDMPo, June 12, 1992, at 1.
182. See, e.g., Jack Miles, Blacks Versus Browns, ATIANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1992, at 41;
Jeffrey Schmalz, Miami's New Ethnic Conflict: Haitians vs. American Blacks, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 1989, at Al; Frank H. Wu, At Lowell High, Who Is Equal to Whom?, S.F. CHRON.,
Sept. 21, 1994, at A23.
183. See Third Amended Complaint, supra note 69, at 9.
184. The plaintiffs are employing statutes, Title VII and 28 U.S.C. § 1983, originally
designed for black minority victim claims against white majority perpetrators. Plaintiffs'
rhetoric ignores interracial interactions and instead somewhat tortuously fits racial references
within a binary opposition, referring to defendants' agents as "neither African American nor
Hispanic." Third Amended Complaint, supra note 69, passim.
185. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
186. For a view on the historical, legal, and practical relevance of this distinction, see
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2120-23 {1995) {Stevens, J., dissenting).

February 1997]

Critical Race Praxis

861

interchangeable. "Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of
lasting harm to our society,"187 and therefore equal protection anal
ysis "is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefit
ted."188 The fact that race is involved is all that matters. Courts
need not interrogate racial identities or the history of racial
subordination.189
O'Connor's approach, which Justice Antonin Scalia endorsed by
his ringing pronouncement in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
that "we are just one race . . . American,"190 presents a twist on the
notion of constitutional colorblindness. That twist entails the
Court's conscious acknowledgment of interracial competition and
conflict in "multiracial America" as justification for its de facto pro
hibition of affirmative race consciousness in governmental racial
classifications.191 Implicit in this contradictory recognition-nonrec
ognition of interracial dynamics is the decision not to develop a
meaningful interracial jurisprudence.
How has this occurred? Over the last twenty years, the
Supreme Court has used America's multiracial demographics and
the existence of interminority competition and conflict to transform
whites from the centuries-long historical oppressor of people of
color into "just another group competing with many others."192
Based on the Court's rulings, whites now can be considered "a vic
tim group with the same moral and legal claims" as other groups.193
A detailed analysis of how this has occurred is beyond the scope of
187. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 657.
188. 509 U.S. at 651 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,-494
(1989) (plurality opinion)).
189. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 650-51; see also Freeman, supra note 49, at 1412, 1425
(describing "ethnic fungibility" as a core idea of colorblindness).
190. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 21l9 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring).
191. I use the term "de facto prohibition" because the majority's position is in effect one
of colorblindness. While Justices Scalia and Thomas argue for a complete ban on racial clas
sifications, see Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118-19, the majority's formal position is that all racial
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny and that a classification will survive such scrutiny
under compelling circumstances. See Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1899 (1996). The judicial
reality, however, has been that strict in theory is fatal in fact. The majority's de facto accept
ance of colorblindness as constitutional doctrine is revealed in two ways. The first is Justice
O'Connor's stated goal of "eliminat[ing]" governmental use of "racial stereotypes" and her
apparent equating of racial stereotypes with the recognition of race. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647;
see also Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1964 (1996). The second, as Justice Stevens points out
in his Shaw II dissent, is that the plaintiffs "claimed [a] violation of a shared [citizens'] right
to a colorblind districting process" and that the claim emanates "from the Court's unarticu
lated recognition of a new substantive due process right to 'colorblind' redistricting itself."
Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1909-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192. Natapoff, supra note 26, at 1062.
193. Id.
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this article.194 · A summary description, however, is useful. In its
most recent rulings, the Court has attributed interminority competi
tion and conflict to "racial factionalism," "separatism," and "bal
kanization," which in tum it has attributed to consciousness of
racial differences.195 For the conservative majority on the Court,
the evil of racism in intensely conflictual multiracial America is no
longer individual and institutional acts of white supremacy, but
rather the recognition of racial differences in the form of racial clas
sifi.cations. Race consciousness leads to factionalization and separa
tism, which lead to conflict. In short, racial classifications "threaten
. . . to incite racial hostility." 196 The very existence of governmental
racial classifications, race factions, and interminority conflict are
circumstantial proof of the causal links.
With this description of racial reality, the Court's ostensible
quest for harmony has focused on outlawing race consciousness.
Only by banning consciousness of racial differences can the govern
ment avoid fostering race factionalism; only by avoiding race fac
tionalism can the government reduce racial conflict. Of course, a
ban on consciousness of racial differences would make sense only if
racial distinctions were unworthy of notice - a seemingly tough
conclusion to draw in light of America's history of differential white
racist treatment of minorities and continuing socio-economic differ194. Alexandra Natapoff traces the Supreme Court's treatment of intenninority conflicts
from United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), and Sl!aw I, 509 U.S. 630, through Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct.
2647 (1994), to gain insight into "issues of race-based redistribution, political process, and
intergroup conflict that seem to most concern the Court." Natapoff, supra note 26, at 106579.
In these recent cases, the Supreme Court denied the existence of racial hierarchies and
overlooked complex intenninority issues. In UJO, the Court, in employing a "simplistic
white/black scheme," id. at 1068, classified Brooklyn's Hasidim as white in order to allow a
redistricting plan bisecting the Hasidic community. See UJ0, 430 U.S. at 173-74 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part). The Court in Bakke advanced the image of minority groups competing
for power, characterizing whites as deserving the same protections as historically disadvan
taged minorities. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-18. Similarly, in Croson, Justice O'Connor in
voked a multiple racial minority context to invalidate Richmond's construction set-aside
program, stating that the progr�m's "gross overinclusiveness" of nonblack minority groups
rendered the plan disadvantageous to African Americans themselves. See Croson, 488 U.S.
at 506. Likewise, the Court in Shaw I recognized the existence of a multiracial polity while
warning that "racial gerrymandering may balkanize us into competing racial factions." Shaw
I, 509 U.S. at 657. See also supra note 191 and accompanying text. In De Grandy, the Court
failed to address the intenninority issue by refusing to choose between the creation of either
an African American or a Latino district. See De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2663; see also
Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, 47
STAN. L. REV. 957, 969-74 (1995) (addressing the limitations of traditional race-based policies
and their failure to accotint for multiracial identity).
195. See Natapoff, supra note 26, at 1062.
196. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 643.
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ences among whites and nonwhite racial groups.191 The Court nev
ertheless has reached that conclusion by characterizing all racial
groups as one and the same: racial groups, including whites, are
fungible, with equivalent moral and legal claims to freedom from
discrimination. What justifies this characterization? The Court has
pointed to the "facts" of multiracial America, where every group
inflicts harm upon another. When it comes to discrimination, no
group is better · or worse than any other: At bottom, "we are just
one race."198
Three consequences of this characterization of multiracial con
flict are salient. First, as Alexandra Natapoff points out, the Court
recognizes multiracial conflicts to justify its ban on affirmative race
consciousness.199 Second, in practice, the ban on race conscious
ness is being applied by courts not to promote equality for non
white racial groups or to redress interracial justice grievances but to
validate white claims of discrimination and to "reliev[e] whites of
the costs of forty years of [antidiscrimination] remedial meas
ures. "200 Third, and returning to the point of this discussion, the
Court's acknowledgment of multiracial conflicts serves ironically as
the foundation for its jurisprudential blindness to interracial
claims.201
These consequences suggest explicit and implicit rationales for
the Court's recognition of multiracial conflict without an articulated
position on how to analyze or address justice claims arising from
those conflicts. Explicitly, an interracial jurisprudence that is atten
tive to racial differences and intergroup histories is at best unneces197. See HACKER, supra note 79 {describing widespread socio-economic inequalities be
tween whites and blacks).
198. The Court's recent rulings in Adarand, Shaw I, Shaw II, and Croson implicitly adopt .
this line of reasoning. For a critique of the impact of the Court's de facto colorblindness
rulings in these cases, see Jayne Chong-Soon Lee, Navigating the Topology ofRace, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 747 (1994); Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term - Foreword: The
Constitution ofChange: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REv.
30, 106-09 {1993); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Dis
tricts, " and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92
MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993); Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEXAS L. REv. 381
(1989); Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equgl (Jpportu
nity, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2128 {1989); Jen-L-Wong, Casenote: Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena: A Colorblind Remedy Eliminating Racial Preferences, 18 U. HAW. L. REv. 939 {1996).
199. See Natapoff, supra note 26, at 1061-62.
200. Id. at 1062.
201. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind, " 44 STAN. L. REv.
1, 5-6, 16-28 (1991) {describing the crincept of racial nonrecognition). For an interesting
discussion of the "original intent" of the Constitution's framers not to embrace colorblind
ness, see Jeffrey Rosen, Remarks at Conference, Race, Law and Justice: The Rehnquist Court
and the American Dilemma, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 567, 573-75 {1996).
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sary to dispensing racial justice and at worst inimical to the nation's
interest in racial harmony. Implicitly, jurisprudential blindness to
the dynamics of interracial justice claims enhances the legitimacy of
the Court's overall ban on race consciousness.
If this explains, at least in part, the federal judiciary's constricted
approach to interracial justice claims, what explains the silence of
legal scholars? Why have legal scholars, like the courts, until very
recently, refrained from pursuing the jurisprudential underpinnings
of intergroup justice claims?202 One possible reason is that the
courts' reluctance to acknowledge, let alone engage, the interracial
justice issues has deprived scholars of legal records to scrutinize.
Another reason for the comparative silence may be that no theoret
ical core has coalesced. Early efforts at developing an interracial
jurisprudence seem fractured and sometimes even at odds. Some
authors examine Court treatment of interminority rights issues and
search for an intergroup jurisprudential base for adjudicating Title
VII and equal protection antidiscrimination claims.203 Others focus
on the process of adjudicating antidiscrimination claims and the po
tential for lawyer exacerbation of intergroup conflicts ;204 on inter
group reconciliation predicated on "doing justice" ;20s and on
monopoly capitalism and the fostering of interminority economic
competition.206 With these articles in the foreground, the foreword
to the Stanford Law Review symposium, by Charles Lawrence III,
tacks in the opposite direction. It cautions race scholars about the
202. In 1989, Mari Matsuda suggested that race jurisprudence attend to differences in
racial and ethnic groups in terms of power and political participation. See Mari J. Matsuda,
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320,
2324 (1989). Of the recent articles addressing the topic, several were published in 1993 fol
lowing the South Central Los Angeles uprising and the remainder in 1995. See Brest &
Oshige, supra note 81; Cho, supra note 24; Dong, supra note 26; Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the
Rhetoric ofAssimilation and Cultural Pluralism: Addressing the Tension of Separatism and
Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multiracial Society, 81 CAL. L. REV. 863 (1993); Bill Ong
Hing, In the Interest ofRacial Harmony: Revisiting the Lawyer's Duty to Work for the Com
mon Good, 47 STAN. L REv. 901 (1995) [hereinafter Hing, Racial Harmony]; Lisa C.
Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story ofAfrican American/Korean American
Conflict: How We Constructed "Los Angeles, " 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1581 (1993); Charles R.
Lawrence III, Foreword: Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47
STAN. L. REv. 819 (1995) [hereinafter Lawrence, Transformation]; Natapoff, supra note 26;
Deborah Ramirez, supra note 194; Reginald Leamon Robinson, "The Other Against Itself":
Deconstructing the Violent Discourse Between Korean and African Americans, 67 S. CAL. L.
REV. 15 (1993); Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances, supra note 149; see also Kimberl£: Cren
shaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women
of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241 (1991) (analyzing identities within racial communities).
203. See Natapoff, supra note 26; Ramirez, supra note 194.
204. See Hing, Racial Harmony, supra note 202.
205. See Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances, supra note 149.
206. See Robinson, supra note 202.
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distracting potential of interracial inquiry: the diversion of atten
tion from the structural source of intergroup conflict in America white supremacy.207 Perhaps this all-over-the-map feel to the few
articles on interracial jurisprudence simply means that intermi
nority jurisprudence is in its early stages; perhaps it indicates schol
arly ambivalence.
Still another explanation for the lack of attention to interracial
justice issues, which applies to the courts and litigants as well as
legal scholars, may be political. Discussion of interracial group con
flict is considered taboo, a subject too explosive for whites who
want not to be perceived as saying simply "see, they're racist too,"
and for people of color who do not want to detract societal and
legal focus from white positioning atop a racial hierarchy.
For these reasons, among others, it is unsurprising that workable
legal frameworks and language for interracial justice have yet to
emerge. This void, although understandable, is a highly problem
atic aspect of law's intensifying dissociation from racial justice.
Workable frameworks and language are necessary not only to chal
lenge the Court's jurisprudential blindness, not only to address jus
tice claims arising from the realities of interminority conflicts, but
also, I assert, to facilitat� the formation of durable interracial alli
ances and coalitions.
Prominent race scholars Manning Marable and bell hooks,
speaking to teachers, political lawyers, and community activists, lo
cate the only hope for African Americans and other racial minori
ties in the formation of interracial alliances, whether those alliances
are created to enhance cooperative working and living arrange
ments or to combat white racism.20s Marable's "theory of libera
tion," which is built on a "transformationist redistribution of
resources and the democratization of state power along more egali
tarian lines," and hook's "practical model for social change," which
speaks to the inducement of enlightened whites to surrender race
privileges, both depend upon political power mustered through co
alitions of racial groups that are, at some deep level, mutually dis
trustful. The problem with this vision, as George Fredrickson
points out, is that neither Marable nor hooks offers a persuasive
view of how to forge interracial alliances or form and maintain co207. See Lawrence, Transformation, supra note 202.
208. See BELL HOOKS, KILLING RAGE: ENDING RACISM 201-03 (1995); MANNING
MARABLE, BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE: TRANSFORMING AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICS
194-202 (1995).
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alitions at a time of "disruptive equilibrium. "209 I suggest that theo
rizing about and acting practically upon concrete interracial justice
claims is one aspect of the "how to." In the face of increasingly
complex intergroup justice grievances and the limits of legal justice,
the call for alliances and coalition-building underscores the need for
development of a sophisticated interracial jurisprudence with prac
tical implications. That jurisprudence needs to unravel the ideolog
ical strands of the Court's recognition of multiracial conflict to
justify its ban of affirmative race consciousness, to interrogate the
complexities of group agency and responsibility for disabling inter
group constraints, and in doing so to respond to justice grievances
among communities of color that undermine alliance-forging
efforts.210

III.

RETHINKING RACE THEORY AND POLITICAL LAWYERING
PRACTICE: THE PRACTICAL TuRN IN REcoNSTRUCTIVE

JURISPRUDENCE
In addressing limits of antisubordination practice, Part I de
scribed a disjuncture between progressive race theory on the one
hand and political lawyering practice and community activism on
the other. Part II described the dissociation of antidiscrimination
law from racial justice for racial communities and identified five
broad socio-legal explanations. That Part also explored the inade
quacy of the white-on-black jurisprudential paradigm for interracial
justice claims. The disjuncture and dissociation, I suggest, cloud ra
cial minorities' perceptions of justice in post-civil rights America:
they recognize the United States' history of racial injustice through
law while questioning contemporary antidiscrimination law's capac
ity for engendering justice; and they see continuing white domi
nance in many facets of American life while acknowledging
changing racial demographics, increasing interracial conflict, and
the legal system's reluctance to engage meaningfully with the dy
namics of those conflicts. In this setting, progressive race theorists,
political lawyers, and racial communities struggle against potent ne
oconservative race practice.

As part of this struggle, I suggest an emphasis on a reconceived
theoretics of practice - a critical race praxis. Critical race praxis
seeks to bridge at least partially both the "gap of chasmic propor209. See Fredrickson, supra note 143, at 16-18.
210. See infra section IV.B.3 (outlining an interracial praxis); see also Yamamoto, Re
thinking Alliances, supra note 149, at 60 (developing the notion of differential racialization
and constrained racial group agency as part of a framework for interracial justice).
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tions" between race theory and political lawyering and the growing
divide of law from racial justice. It focuses neither on abstract race
theory nor on narrow legal doctrine, although these are aspects of
bridging. As described in the Part IV, critical race praxis focuses on
developing and then translating critical theoretical insights about
race, culture, and law into operational ideas and language for an
tisubordination practice and, in tum, rethinking theory in light of
new practice experience.
In this Part, I critique and extend insights of critical theory and
pragmatism to locate critical race praxis within a jurisprudence of
reconstruction. That jurisprudence of reconstruction, including its
"practical turn," inhabits the tension between postmodernism's de
spairing unpacking of liberal legalism and modernism's zealous em
brace of liberatory ideals of equality and justice. I acknowledge,
without engaging in, the sometimes intense debates about the con
ceptual soundness, political legitimacy, and practical viability of di
vergent theoretical schools.211. The purpose of the following
sections is not to fully describe or compare and evaluate theoretical
schools, but to employ and extend available insights to recognize a
jurisprudence of reconstruction and, within it, to sketch a frame
work for a race praxis.
A.

Critical Race Theory: Inhabiting the Tension

Critical race theory both illuminates and offers a beginning re
sponse to the limitatic;ms of legal justice for racial minorities. It
does so by employing critical pragmatic tools to examine racial jus
tice in connection with the interplay of law, race, culture, and social
structure.212 A summary of the "distinctive insights" of critical race
211. See, e.g., Anne Coughlin, Regulating the Self. Autobiographical Performances in
Outsider Scholarship, 81 VA. L. REV. 1229 (1995) (charging critical race theorists and femi
nist legal scholars with replicating existing liberal social arrangements through their misuse of
autobiography); Jerome Culp, Telling a Black Legal Story: Privilege, Authenticity, "Blun
ders, " and Transformation in Outsider Narratives, 82 VA. L. REv. 69 (1996) (response to
Coughlin critique); Richard Delgado, Coughlin's Complaint: How to Disparage Outsider
Writing, One Year Later, 82 VA. L. REV. 95 (1996) (response to Coughlin critique).
212. Concerning racial justice, critical theory's challenge to modernism produces four in
quiries into understandings about socio-legal institutions, processes, and relationships. The
"critical" dimension of the inquiry demands critical social analysis: (1) recognition that ex
isting social identities and arrangements are not necessarily rational, natural, or inevitable,
thus offering possibilities for social action for subordinated groups; (2) an account of the
historical and cultural conditions that shape the point of view of social actors, thus acknowl
edging that actors may be differently situated and have differing vantage points from which
they view the social world; (3) an examination of power and societal structures (political,
economic, religious, social), thereby illuminating connections between power and the con
struction of knowledge and between the use of knowledge and oppression or liberation; and
(4) scrutiny of social meanings attached to dynamic categories (such as race, African Ameri
canism, equality) and frameworks (such as legal liberalism, neoconservatism, Marxism),
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theory213 is useful, even though it overlooks nuance and internal
disagreement and purveys what may be an overstated sense of
political unity among critical race scholars.
Critical race theorists seek to eliminate, or at least diminish, ra
cial oppression in American society.214 To achieve this they en
deavor to transform jurisprudential dialogue in a way that furthers
antisubordination practice. The "critical" aspect of their project
draws upon postmodern theory.215 Critical race theorists decon
struct the limitations of traditional liberal legal discourse and the
ways in which that discourse tends to exclude voices on society's
margins and to perpetuate structural inequality.216 They thus reveal
the social construction of legal concepts presented as fixed and nat
ural, challenge the "efficacy of both liberal legal theory and com
munitarian ideals as vehicles for racial progress, destabilize the
supposedly neutral criteria of meritocracy and social order, and call
for a re-examination of the very concept of 'race.' "211
In this fashion, critical race theorists draw upon postmodern an
alytical techniques to reveal the law's blindness toward unconscious
racism,218 the ways in which legal discourse inscribes and repro
duces subordinating images of racial groups, and the ways in which
legal institutions and discourse contribute to the construction and
maintenance of racial hierarchies.219 In short, critical race theory
analyzes ways in which law ignores cultural domination within law's
own processes and the ways in which those processes contribute to
racial oppression.
The illuminating embrace of deconstruction, however, poses a
postmodernist dilemma for critical race theorists committed to justhereby recognizing ways context imbues categories and frameworks with social significance
and linking individuals and groups to social structures. See generally CRAIG CALHOUN, CRIT
ICAL SOCIAL THEORY 35-36 {1995) (explaining four forms of critical social theory that de
pend on historical understanding and analysis).
213. See Robert L. Hayman, Jr., The Color of Tradition: Critical Race Theory and
Postmodern Constitutional Traditionalism, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 62-64 (1995).
214. See MAru J. MATSUDA ET AL., WoRDs THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6-7 (1993).
215. My use of the term "critical theory" conflates several schools of postmodern
thought, including poststructuralism, deconstruction, and critical social theory. See Harris,
Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, supra note 35, at 749-50.
216. See Cook, supra note 114, at 989-92 (defining deconstruction).
217. Hayman, supra note 213, at 62-63 (footnotes omitted). See generally CRITICAL
RACE THEORY: THE CUTIING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995); CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
218. See Lawrence, Unconscious Racism, supra note 117, at 342-44.
219. See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text. See also Freeman, supra note 49, at
1409.
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tice through law. Postmodernity's "crisis of truth is concomitant
with a crisis of justice."220 Because postmodern theory undermines
both the positive and normative aspects of law, it deprives legal jus
tice of its conventional foundation.

[Postmodernism] suggest[s] that what has been presented in our so
cial-political and our intellectual traditions, as knowledge, truth, ob
jectivity, and reasons are actually merely the effects of a particular
form of social power, the victory of a particular way of representing
the world.221
Fully extended, it means that law "cannot be authentic, cannot be
determinate, cannot be justified."222 In short, justice cannot exist
through law. Civil rights laws, and the civil rights movement that
gave rise to those laws, engender little more than illusions of racial
progress while reinforcing harmful racial hierarchies. Some critical
theorists accept this extended postmodern "truth. "223
Others, including many critical race theorists, feminist legal
scholars, pragmatists, and gay and lesbian scholars, at least partially
reject it. They understand the limits of "rights talk" and the ways in
which civil rights laws can be used to reinforce the racial status quo.
They also, however, perceive potentially transformative value in
law and rights assertion for disempowered groups, and they em
brace modernist notions of hope and justice through reconceived
ideas of law and political struggle.224 They seek to shape "affirmative projects . . . [i]nformed not only by theory but also by the lived
experience . . . dedicated not merely to deconstructive critique but
as well to a reconstructive praxis. "225
Critical race theorists thus face an apparent "performative con
tradiction" - employing theoretical tools that deny law's authen
ticity while seeking to remake law practically so that it performs for
the end of racial justice. Angela Harris locates within that tension
potential for a reconstructive jurisprudence that uses upgraded
modernist tools to attack the material conditions of racial oppres
sion without acceding to illusions of voluntary power sharing or an
220. Hayman, supra note 213, at 61.
221. Anthony E. Cook, Reflections on Postmodemism, 26 NEw ENG. L. REv. 751, 757-58
{1992).
222. Hayman, supra note 213, at 61.
223. See, e.g., Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights - Consciousness and the Pact
of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEXAS L. REv. 1563 (1984).
224. See Elvia R. Arriola, Gendered Inequality: Lesbians, Gays, and Feminist Legal The
ory, 9 BERKELEY WoMEN's L. J. 103 (1994); Patricia J. Wtlliams, Alchemical Notes: Recon
structing Ideals From Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987).
225. Hayman, supra note 213, at 61.
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inevitable societal march toward racial justice.226 More particu
larly, Harris argues that the task should not be to try to resolve the
tension abstractly, "but rather consciously to inhabit that very ten
sion" - to "attempt to reconstruct political modernism itself " by
drawing upon that which has made it indispensable to people of
color in their struggles against racial subordination and by restruc
turing that which has made it inadequate.227 She perceives critical
race theory's ultimate vision as redemptive and offers an approach
to remaking modernism that is both sophisticated and disenchanted
in its efforts to link race theory with antisubordination practice.228
B.

Jurisprudence of Reconstruction: The Practical Turn

The jurisprudence of reconstruction lays a conceptual founda
tion for the continuing struggle against racial oppression. 1\vo clus
ters of critical race scholarship, explicitly embracing a critical
pragmatic approach to law, build upon that foundation and intro
duce a practical reconstructive dimension to race writing. One clus
ter of critical race writing endeavors to integrate high theory with
antisubordination legal doctrine. Mari Matsuda, Charles Lawrence
III, Richard Delgado, and Kimberle Crenshaw, for example, in
their book Words that Wound, reconstruct constitutional and tort
doctrines to address regulation of public and private racial hate
speech. In other works, Matsuda offers a reinterpretation of Title
VII doctrine for accent discrimination,229 and Lawrence draws
upon Freudian and cognitive psychology in deriving a "cultural
meaning" test to evaluate equal protection race discrimination chal
lenges.230 In related fashion, Jerome Culp explores the Supreme
226. See Harris, Jurisprudence ofReconstruction, supra note 35, at 743-44 (crediting Mari
Matsuda with articulation of the reconstructive jurisprudence concept and developing it
further).
227. See id. at 760.
228. See id. at 766-67. In order to develop a sophisticated theory of the racialized subject,
Harris suggests that critical race theory continue to draw upon scholarship from other disci
plines and look beyond the black-white struggle. She proposes that critical race theory aspire
to disenchantment with reason by "giving up a certain romanticism about the rhetorical ap
paratus of modernism" while focusing on the "moment to moment struggles to alleviate suf
fering and alienation." Id. at 778. By recognizing the limitations of rationalism in antiracist
struggle, she suggests that critical race theorists focus on empowerment as a goal in itself
instead of as a step on the road to emancipation. See also Frank Michelman, Bringing Law to
Life: A Plea for Disenchantment, 14 CORNELL L. REv. 256, 257, 268 {1989) {describing a
dialogic conception of politics and arguing for "bringing law back to politics and politics back
to the law"); Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Juris
prudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 {1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Multiple Con
sciousness] {calling formultiple consciousness as part of a jurisprudence of reconstruction).
229. See Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Ju
risprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991).
230. See Lawrence, Unconscious Racism, supra note 117.
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Court's recent Title VII cases and offers a reform proposal for an
tidiscrimination policy as part of a larger strategy for change.231
Lisa Ikemoto reconstructs forced medical treatment-pregnancy
analysis232 and Taunya Banks examines discrimination against
women of color with AIDS233 in light of critical theory insights.
Roy Brooks and Mary Jo Newborn, in their critique of critical race
theory, conclude on balance that critical race theory offers trans
formative approaches to traditional equal protection and Title VII
doctrines.234

A second cluster of critical race theory writing links critical race
theory insights about multiple consciousness235 and alternative and
transformative ways of legal "knowing" to processes of racial jus
tice. Gerald Torres links those insights to the practical import of
"local knowledge,"236 and Robert Wtlliams, Jr. connects them to
methods underlying a North American indigenous vision of "how
different peoples from radically divergent cultural backgrounds try
to achieve peace and accommodation."237 In another work I tie
those and related insights specifically to court process - a view of
courts as sites of, and participants in, "cultural performances" con
cerning outsider challenges to existing social and legal arrange
ments.238 That view of court process draws upon the work of
Delgado and Lawrence, among others, which constructs sophisti
cated frameworks for the understanding and employment of narra
tives in law.239
231. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Small Numbers, Big Problems, Black Men, and the
Supreme Court: A Reform Program for Title VII After Hicks, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. 241 (1994);
see also Crenshaw, supra note 37; Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., The Michael Jackson Pill:
Equality, Race, and Culture, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2613 (1994); D. Marvin Jones, No Time for
Trumpets: Title VII, Equality, and Fin de Siecle, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2311 (1992).
232. See Lisa Ikemoto, Furthering the Inquiry: Race, Class, and Culture in the Forced
Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women, 59 TENN. L. REV. 487 (1992).
233. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Women and AIDS - Racism, Sexism and Classism, 17
N Y.U. REv. OF L. & Soc. CHANGE 351 (1989-1990).
234. See Roy L. Brooks & Mary Jo Newborn, Critical Race Theory and Classical-Liberal
Civil Rights Scholarship: A Distinction Without a Difference?, 82 CAL. L. REV. 787 (1994).
235. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism In Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581 (1990); Matsuda, Multiple Consciousness, supra note 228.
236. See Gerald Torres, Local Knowledge, Local Color: Critical Legal Studies and the
Law of Race Relations, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1043 (1988).
237. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Linking Arms Together: Multicultural Constitutionalism in a
North American Indigenous Vision of Law and Peace, 82 CAL. L. REv. 981, 994 (1994).
238. See Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Courts and the Cultural Performance: Native
Hawaiians' Uncertain Federal and State Law Rights to Sue, 16 U. HAW. L. REv. 1 (1994)
[hereinafter Yamamoto et al., Cultural Performance],
239. See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narra
tive, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411 (1989) [hereinafter Delgado, Storytelli!lg for Oppositionists];
.
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Those clusters of reconstructive writing, taken together, can be
described as the critical race theory practical turn. That practical
turn responds in part to the caution over "hyperabstract theorizing
[among scholars] that makes a public debate about race and racism
impossible,"240 and in part to the critical race theory goal of con
tributing materially to diminishing racial oppression. It responds
not only to the limitations of legal justice but also to the disjuncture
between progressive race theory and political lawyering and the
limits of antisubordination practice.
That practical tum itself, thus far, appears to be both salutary
and limited. On the one hand, it addresses antisubordination prac
tice in a potentially useful fashion. It addresses judicial acceptance
and application of new, possibly racially transformative, legal rules
and methods. Judges comprise the primary audience for those writ
ings-particularly federal judges. Civil rights and political lawyers
comprise the secondary audience - those, in traditional terms, ac
tually "doing law" for people; those arguing the rules and working
with methods of factual proof on behalf of individual or organiza
tional disputants involved in litigation.
On the other hand, critical race theory's practical tum, as re
flected in these clusters of writing, is limited. It focuses potentially
transformative antisubordination practice on judges, lawyers, legal
analysis, and methods of proof. Judges and lawyers are often cru
cial players in race controversies, and new doctrines and procedural
rules, if adopted and applied, can assist antisubordination claim
ants. Critical race theory's own analyses of doctrine and process,
however, sharply reveal law's contingency and indeterminacy in
handling race controversies, usually to the detriment of racial group
members, particularly in an era of conservative Reagan- and Bush
appointed judges.241 The focus of critical race theory's practical
turn on legal analysis and the reframing of legal doctrine is thus
useful yet limited.

In light of critical race theory's recognition of the special value
of "rights talk" for racial communities,242 I assert something more is
at play. That something more moves rights discourse beyond what
judges and lawyers are traditionally thought to do in the courtroom
and through case opinions. That something more is found in the
Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus,
1990 DUKE LJ. 431 (1991).
240. Harris, Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, supra note 35, at 779.
241. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NoT SAVED 5 (1987).
242. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND R1mrrs 146-65 (1991).

Critical Race Praxis

February 1997]

873

practical, real-world benefits and disadvantages of modernist narra
tives for communities of color that are struggling politically, eco
nomically, and legally against subordination.243 These narratives
tend to embrace into the language of rights, which derive meaning
not from their objective truth, but from how they facilitate self-defi
nition by those often ignored and from how they galvanize and sup
port multifaceted racial group actions against subordination in
places and at levels at which subordination is experienced and con
tested - in courtrooms, schools, workplaces, churches, government
agencies, public accommodations, and social clubs. That something
more is praxis.
IV.

CRITICAL RA CE PRAXIS

At a gathering of law teachers of color in March of 1995, Robert
Williams, Jr. called for a future critical race practice. Wondering
how professors unconnected with actual antiracist struggles could
produce meaningful progressive theory, he urged race scholars to
spend less time on abstract theorizing and more time on actual
community law-based antisubordination practice.244 He en
couraged scholars' involvement in setting up lega� clinics, working
with community organizations, guiding student activists, advising
local tribunals, speaking with politicians and bureaucrats, and draft
ing regulations.
Similarly, in Rebellious Lawyering245 Gerald Lopez argues for
antisubordination theorizing that focuses on practical community
centered lawyering. He offers a foundation for progressive lawyer
ing grounded in the particulars of peoples' lives, supportive of com
munity members' problem-solving skills, and sensitive to the
dynamics of neighborhood, local, state, and national politics. In re
lated fashion, Luke Cole calls for environmental justice for poor
people and people of color. He suggests "practicing law in a way
that empowers people, that encourages the formation and strength
ening of client groups, and that sees legal tactics in the context of
broader [political] strategies."246
243. See Harris, Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, supra note 35, at 753. Those narratives
embrace a "faith . . . that enlightenment leads to empowerment, and that empowerment leads
to emancipation." Id. at 753.
244. See Robert Williams, Jr., Keynote Address at Western Law Teachers of Color Con
ference (Mar., 1995).
245. L6PEZ, supra note 44.
246. Luke Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for
Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 648, 654 (1992).
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Williams thus calls for critically informed race practice, L6pez
for community-centered rebellious lawyering, and Cole for legal
tactics by racial minorities and the poor cast within the context of
broader political strategies. I move a step further in the jurispru
dence of reconstruction. I suggest for progressive race scholars,
political lawyers, and community activists an explicit race praxis
characterized by reflective action: infusing antiracism practice with
aspects of critical inquiry247 and pragmatism,248 and then recasting
theory in light of practical experience. Race praxis begins to ad
dress directly the disjuncture between progressive race theory and
political lawyering practice and to respond in part to the dissocia
tion of law from racial justice. For race theorists, a race praxis may
mean enhanced attention to theory translation and deeper engage
ment with frontline action; for political lawyers and community ac
tivists, it may mean increased attention to a critical rethinking of
what race is, how civil rights are conceived, and why law sometimes
operates discursively as a power strategy. For theorists, lawyers,
and activists collectively, it may encompass a critical reframing of
247. See supra note 212; see also Cook, supra note 114, at 1012-14 (urging a critical praxis
grounded in Martin Luther King's linkage of "critical theology" with strategies of political
mobilization).
248. In the late 1980s, the pragmatism of the early 20th century reemerged in philosophy
and law. See RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989); CORNEL
WEST, THE .AMERICAN EVASION OF I'Hrr.OSOPHY (1989); CORNEL WEsr, PROPHETIC FRAO·
MENTS (1988); Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1597
(1990); Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL L. REV. 1699
(1990); Joseph Singer, Property and Coercion in Federal Indian Law: The Conflict Between
Critical and Complacent Pragmatism, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1821 (1990). For some legal
pragmatists, practical reasoning offered a rough but workable alternative to the widely chal
lenged positivist legal method, or legal formalism. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Legislation
and Its Interpretation: A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REV. 431 (1989); Richard A. Posner, What Has
Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL L. REV. 1653 (1990). For others, the more extreme
practical-reasoning proponents suffered from the same infirmity as their predecessors: they
offered no normative baselines for decisionmaking and their resort to "common sense" sim
ply shielded bald personal preferences and intuitive judgments. See Steven Walt, Some
Problems ofPragmatic Jurisprudence, 70 TEXAS L. REv. 317, 330-31 (1992) (reviewing RICH·
ARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990)). In response to these concerns
about revived pragmatism's "impoverished pluralism," while acknowledging its continuing
methodological appeal, Mari Matsuda in 1990 called for a "pragmatism modified." Mari J,
Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1763 (1990) [hereinafter Matsuda, Pragmatism]; see also Radin, supra. Consistent with tradi
tional pragmatism and more recent approaches to practical reasoning, Matsuda identified a
critical pragmatic method that "suggests plural, provisional, and emergent truths . . , [and] is
skeptical of universalized experience and absolute description[s]," and that emphasizes multi
ple consciousness, experience, flexibility, and context. Matsuda, supra, at 1768. In addition,
modified pragmatism embraces "rectification of past injustice and elimination of all present
forms of subordination" as first principles. Id. See also GOLDBERG, supra note 159, at 215
("Pragmatists are thus committed, both philosophically and practically, to oppose all forms of
oppression and domination and to avoid, resist and reject all hierarchical orders in modes of
thinking and social formations."). This latter suggestion bends traditional pragmatism "to
ward liberation." See id. at 216.
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and engagement with racialized practices in business, bankruptcy,
labor, landlord-tenant, family, immigration, and international law
as well as evidence, advocacy, and procedure.
A.

A Definition

Critical race praxis, as I conceive it, combines critical pragmatic
socio-legal analysis with political lawyering and community organiz
ing for justice practice by and for racialized communities.249 Its
central idea is racial justice as antisubordination practice. As recog
nized in the pathbreaking empirical studies of Lind and Tyler, in
addition to ideas and ideals, justice is something experienced.250
Grounded in concrete, often messy and conflictual racial realities, it
is something with which p eople struggle viscerally and
intellectually.251
249. Praxis, as I use the term, is antisubordination action with reflection. See PAULO
FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 52 (1974). Freire, a Brazilian educator, worked with
poor, rural farmers against an oppressive government and private landholding system. He
connected the role of theorists to grassroots work and popular political movements. Freire's
teachers-intellectuals developed liberation theory from the experiences of the poor and,
through pastoral workers and community leaders, translated theory into frontline engage
ment with antisubordination practice. Focusing on reading and writing as tools of organiza
tion and action, Freire's praxis of experience-rethinking-translation-engagement produced
for the farmers and their collaborators opportunities for reflective action. See id. at 52.
From the same soil that nourished Freire's praxis, liberation theology emerged in the
1970s in response to Latin American governments' oppression of the poor. See generally
PmLLIP BERRYMAN, LIBERATION THEOLOGY: ESSENTIAL FACTS ABOUT THE REVOLUTION
MOVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND BEYOND (1987). Radical theologians reinterpreted
Christian faith from the perspective of the poor, used theology to criticize oppressive social
structures and ideologies, and critiqued church orthodoxy. See id. at 4-7. In translating cri
tique into practice, the theologians deepened Freire's notion of praxis. They identified a
theory-of-praxis, meaning theory about oppression and resistance continually reformulated
by the insights, questions, and experiences of those oppressed. They also identified a theory
/or-praxis, meaning theoretical "input [in]to grass-roots action in the form of criteria, meth
ods," and theory guiding antisuborclination community practices. Id. at 86.
250. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 106. Praxis scholars, according to Charles Lawrence,
are "practitioners of the word" - those who integrate teaching, scholarship, learning, and
activism. See Charles Lawrence III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy As Scholarship As
Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2231 (1992). Consistent with the idea of practitioners of the
word, Lawrence and Mari Matsuda have a forthcoming work on affirmative action that, in
important respects, is a praxis work. Blending theory, empirical studies, stories, personal
narratives, and activist experience, and linking history to current conditions, their book en
deavors to translate critical socio-legal analyses into compelling insights about, and practical
arguments for, affirmative action that are addressed to theorists, civil rights lawyers, and
activists. See MARI J. MA'ISUDA & CHARI.Es LAWRENCE III, WE WoN'T Go BACK: MAKING
THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE AcnoN (forthcoming 1997).
251. See infra section IV.B.1 (grounding race praxis in racial realities). For an account of
race praxis by political lawyers and activists concerning the literal enslavement of immigrant
Thai garment workers in Los Angeles, see Julie Su, The In/visibility ofAsian Garment Work
ers in Our Economic and Legal Systems: The Garment Industry's Dirty Laundry, J. GENDER,
RACE, & JuST. (forthcoming 1997) (describing critical socio-legal analyses about race-gender
issues, political organizing and activism, federal court litigation, and coalition-building with
Latina sweatshop workers).
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Critical race praxis provides structure to justice practice. It
means understanding justice in terms of both method (experience
rethinking-translation-engagement) and norm (first principles of
antisubordination and rectification of injustice).252 Race praxis
thus directs theorists, lawyers, and activists to the specifics of the
immediate grievance or claim (for example, the race-infused inter
action between merchant and customer, the promotion-denial Title
VII claim in United Minorities) and at the same time pushes them to
probe further. It instructs them to employ theory to interrogate
subtext to identify the disabling cultural representations and exer
cises of group power underlying or exacerbating the specific griev
ance, and to assess critically the institutional dynamics (limitations
and potential) of the setting in which justice is practiced. It also
encourages them to translate the insights gleaned from critical
socio-legal inquiry into operational ideas and language for individu
als and groups working to redress grievances. It also means, in ap
propriate instances, critiquing and moving beyond notions of legal
justice pragmatically to heal disabling intergroup wounds and forge
intergroup alliances.
What I offer here are the beginnings of a framework rather than
a fully developed critical race praxis. As part of that framework,
and drawing selectively upon insights of critical race theory, prag
matism, prophetic theology,253 feminist legal theory,254 and envi252. Methodologically, as part of the critical pragmatic process of experience-rethinking·
translation, see supra note 249, race praxis recognizes multiple consciousness, experience, and
flexibility as tools of inquiry, critical pragmatism "give[s] special credence to the perspective
of the subordinated." Matsuda, Pragmatism, supra note 248, at 1764. It identifies exper
iences and narratives of those traditionally on society's margins - not because those exper
iences a�d narratives are "more true" or "more worthy," but because in mainstream justice
discourse they tend to be ignored or minimized. Normatively, race praxis commits its
method to reconstruction, to the "rectification of past injustice and the elimination of all
present forms of subordination." Id. at 1768. It measures a legal strategy by a pragmatic
question: "Does the strategy help dismantle structures of subordination?" Id. at 1771.
For an account of race praxis by political lawyers and activists concerning the literal en·
slavement of immigrant Thai garment workers in Los Angeles, see Su, supra note 251
(describing critical socio-legal analyses about race-gender issues, political organizing and ac
tivism, federal court litigation, and coalition-building with Latina sweatshop workers).
253. See supra notes 212-44 and accompanying text (discussing critical race theory, prag
matism, and prophetic theology).
254. Integrating aspects of critical pragmatism, feminist legal theory has developed a rich,
practice-tested notion of praxis. Feminist legal praxis integrates theoretical insights about
knowledge, language, and power into antisubordination legal practice. See Carol Sanger,
Feminism and Disciplinarity: The Curl ofthe Petals, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 225 (1993); Eliza
beth Schneider et al., Feminist Jurisprudence - The 1990 Myra Bradwell Day Panel, 1
CoLUM. J. GENDER & L. 5 (1991). Feminist legal scholars thus have exposed the nonneutral
legal meanings of family, work, equality, abuse, and welfare and how through those meanings
the law reinforces certain societal perspectives, devalues others, and helps shape community
understandings of events and relationships. See Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Si
lence in Law: The Dilemma ofthe Gendered Nature ofLegal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L.
·
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ronmental justice scholarship,255 I suggest four starting points of
race praxis inquiry. These starting points are the conceptual, the
REV. 886, 888 (1989); Amy E. Hirsch, Income Deeming in the AFDC Program: Using Dual
Track Family Law to Make Poor Women Poorer, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 713,
733-36 (1987); Deborah Maranville, Feminist Theory and Legal Practice: A Case Study on
Unemployment Compensation Benefits and the Male Norm, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1081 (1992);
Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the Reforms:
Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 191 (Ste
phen D. Sugannan & Henna Hill Kay eds., 1990). Those scholars have also developed in
sight into how dominant legal rules that reproduce those meanings can be challenged
practically through court process, legal storytelling, and reconstruction of legal doctrine and
method. See, e.g., Christy Chandler, Race, Gender, and the Peremptory Challenge: A
Postmodern Feminist Approach, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 173 (1995); Trina Grillo, The Medi
ation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991); Mary Jane Moss
man, Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference it Makes, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW
283 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen eds., 1991); Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Dialectic ofRights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of
Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1750, 1840-43 (1990).
255. Environmental justice scholars recently have urged a related praxis approach to
"lawyering for social change" for poor people and racial communities. See Cole, supra note
246, at 667-68. Studies from the late 1980s and early 1990s revealed the inordinately heavy
burden borne by racial communities and the poor as a result of environmental policies and
law enforcement practices. See COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHuRCH OF
CliruST, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE
RACIAL AND Socro-EcoNOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITII HAZARDOUS
WAsrn SITES (1987). The traditional theoretical model of environmental lawyering failed to
protect or further the interests of those groups. Environmental justice scholars have thus
attempted to integrate theories of race and class oppression with environmental law practice.
Environmental justice rests on many factual assumptions and theoretical insights articu
lated by critical race theorists, see supra notes 228-42, and poverty law scholars. See Anthony
V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Leaming Lessons of Client Narrative, 100
YALE L.J. 2107 (1991) (advocating the use of critical storytelling in poverty law practice);
Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory of Re
ceiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861 (1992) (arguing for the incorpo
ration of client narratives in poverty law advocacy). One assumption is that, in general, racial
communities and the poor "understand both the need to use the law and that the system is
stacked against them." Cole, supra note 246, at 648. This assumption leads to the theoretical
insight of "multiple consciousness," or the "dual . . . consciousness [of racial Ininorities to
ward law] which allows survival despite oppression." Id. A second assumption is that "most
problems faced by [the poor and people of color] are not [just] legal problems, but political
and economic ones." Id. This leads to the insight that "[e]ven if the law is 'on their side,'
unless [they] have political or econoinic power as well, they are not likely to prevail." Id. A
third assumption is that "[w]hile environmental problems disproportionately burden poor
people and people of color, they cut across race and class boundaries." Id. at 633. This leads
to the insight of the potential and need for "building multi-racial, multi-class and multicul
tural movements to address structural problems in society." Id.
These factual assumptions and theoretical insights infonn a legal praxis that views justice
in social structural tenns and "embrace[s] . . . tenets of client empowennent[,] group repre
sentation[,] and law as a means, not an end." Id. at 661. It views law and "legal tactics in the
context of broader strategies." Id. at 654. Contextual analyses are translated in concrete
situations into practical or operational tenns through evaluative questions. For Luke Cole,
the three practical questions for evaluating rhetorical and action strategies and tactics aimed
at particular situations of environmental injustice are: Will it educate? Will it build political
movements? Will it address root problems, rather than just symptoms? See id. at 668; see
also Sheila Foster, Race(ial) Matters: The Quest for Environmental Justice, 20 Eco. L.Q. 721
(1993).
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performative, the material, and the reflexive. They are not offered
as a universal theory of justice, nor do they prescribe what racial
justice is, or should be, in any particular situation. Rather, for those
confronting concrete racial conflicts in an attempt to forge "right
relationships," the starting points offer guideposts toward collec
tive, reflective antisubordination practice.256 The earlier discus
sions of Ho and

United Minorities

and the next section's discussion

of critical race praxis implications provide a glimpse of the use of
those starting points in concrete controversies, both as a critique of
ongoing justice practice and as a guide toward future reflective
action.
The "conceptual" starting point encompasses critical socio-legal
analysis and translation. Critical socio-legal analysis examines the
racialization of a controversy and the interconnecting influences of
heterosexism, patriarchy, and class, and locates that examination
within a critique of the political economy. It thus focuses on both
the particulars and the context of a relationship in conflict.
The analysis starts with an examination of the claims emerging
from a controversy, their traditional sources of authority, the sup
porting evidence, and the requested remedy - more or less an or
dinary investigation of a legal claim. In addition, socio-legal
analysis employs tools of critical inquiry in two respects. First, it
256. See John Paul Lederach & Ron Kraybill, The Paradox of Popular Justice: A Practi
tioner's View, in THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY
MEDIATION IN THE UNITED STATES 357, 369 {Shelley Engle Merry & Neal Milner eds., 1994)
[hereinafter MERRY & MILNER] {describing the forging or restoring of "right relationships"
as an end of justice). The race praxis starting points for collective, reflective action resemble
the United Church of Christ's prophetic methodology called "See-Judge-Act." See REV
ROBIN PETERSEN & Lou ANN PARSONS, SEE-JUDGE-Acr: PASTORAL PLANNING FOR A PRO·
PHETIC CHuRCH {1994). Drawn from Latin American and South African liberation theology,
this "praxis cycle" starts with the "See" phase. Seeing begins with concrete experiences, the
stories, of those involved in a justice controversy; not just stock stories repeated by those with
media control, but also stories from the inside expressing human reactions and interpreting
social information. Collected stories, which provide often varying histories of the contro
versy, are then subjected to critical social analysis. See id. at 5. That analysis probes deeply
into foundational questions, asking why one group apparently is suffering at the hands of
another, challenging assumptions underlying common beliefs about the groups involved and
their relationship, and scrutinizing social structures (political, economic, social) for "root
causes" of problems. See id. at 22-24. The goal of this analysis is group awareness, or ac
knowledgment, as a communal foundation for informed group action. The "Judge" phase is
discernment - the identification and integration of guiding, and for the United Church of
Christ, theological, principles and values. See id. at 26-27. Judging is not so much ascertain
ing right or wrong as discerning "what needs to be done" in light of those principles and
values. Discernment thus takes the results of critical social analysis and asks what illumina
tion these principles or values shed on appropriate courses of action and on responsibility for
undertaking those actions. The third phase, "Act," involves engagement. This means goal
setting, planning, and affirmative steps. See id. at 32-34. In bureaucratese, it means plan
implementation; in drama-speak, it means performance. The See-Judge-Act cycle closes with
evaluation - evaluating how the three phases played out in the actual justice controversy
and reflecting on how the process influences the experience. See id. at 34-35.
.
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assesses the justice setting and the implications of the potential "le
galization" of the conflict - the way in which substantive norms
and procedural rules are likely to be construed and applied in light
of both methodological constraints and the interests of and power
alignments among storytellers, advocates, mediators, and . deci
sionmakers on the one hand and politicians, businesses, govern
mental bureaucrats, and community groups on the other.257
Second, critical socio-legal analysis identifies larger justice griev
ances possibly underlying the specific claims. It aims to break apart
distorted cultural representations undergirding intergroup tensions,
to challenge group deployment of oppressive rhetorical, institu
tional and economic structures, and to rearticulate group identities
and conceptualize redress of justice claims, when appropriate, to
foster intergroup healing and reconciliation.25s The socio-legal in
sights gleaned from these inquiries by theorists, lawyers, and com
munity leaders are then translated into operational language for
individuals and groups undertaking "actions" to redress grievances
and forge alliances.259
Action is part of the "performative" starting point of a race
praxis. Performance comes in at least two parts. The first involves
the question of "what?" What practical steps are responsive not
only to the specific claim but also to subtext - the underlying dis
paraging cultural images and exercises of group power that inten
sify historical intergroup grievances? This means acting upon the
operationally translated insights of critical socio-legal analysis,
"performing" in the specific setting to dismantle subordinating so
cial structures and to rectify injustice.260
257. See supra Part II. See generally CASS R. SuNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLIT
ICAL CONFLICT (1996) (describing legal reasoning as it is actually practiced).
258. See supra notes 212, 256 and accompanying text (concerning critical socio-legal
analysis).
259. See infra section IV.B.1 (grounding race and justice theories in the concrete particulars of frontline controversies).
.
260. The ways tlieorists can engage or "perform" are many and varied, including working
witlI or advising political organizations; litigating or consulting with litigation teams; supervis
ing law students on cases challenging institutional autliority or actions; lobbying legislative
and administrative bodies on behalf of specific organizations; working with or serving on
boards of social service and legal service groups; cultivating relations with journalists cover
ing community justice issues; writing journalistic essays; writing critical socio-legal analyses
and developing advocacy positions on specific issues for organizations; drafting legal briefs;
doing legal historical research for community groups; training lay lawyers; and giving issue
and strategy presentations to community groups. See supra note 66. As a law professor, I
have endeavored to engage in many of these activities in collaboration w�th community lead
ers and groups, tlieorists, political lawyers, and legal advocacy organizations. These collabo
rative experiences form a foundation for much of my tlieory writing. See, e.g., Yamamoto et
al., Cultural Performance, supra note 238; Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat, supra note 118;
Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances, supra note 149.
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The second part of the perfonnative dimension involves the
question of "who?" Who should act? Put more specifically, given
my assumption that political lawyers and community activists will
participate, should scholar-theorists engage with the lawyers, orga
nizations, and institutions and endeavor to influence the storytelling
and decisionmaking of a controversy? The praxis response is a
strong yes. One conclusion I draw from interactions with political
lawyers and community activists is that theoretical insights about
race and critical socio-legal analyses of particular controversies are
unlikely to be meaningfully developed and translated for frontline
antisubordination practice unless theorists personally engage with
the difficult, entangled, shifting realities of that practice. The dis
juncture between progressive race theory and political lawyering
and community activism, I suspect, not only chokes useful theory
development and translation, it stifles contemplation of multi
layered actions designed to produce material change.
The "material" starting point of a race praxis is the counterpart
to perfonnativity - the intended consequences of conceptual anal
ysis and performance. It means inquiring into changes in the mate
rial conditions of racial oppression. Change is material when it
occurs simultaneously at two levels. Change must be social-struc
tural; it encompasses fair access to housing and to educational and
job opportunities, the redistribution of societal goods, and the re
making of the democratic structure of public institutions. 261
Change must also be representational; it entails the reassessment of
group cultural traits and the rearticulation of racial identities and
relationships. 26 2 The material starting point thus directs praxis ef
forts toward both the structural and the discursive.
Finally, the "reflexive" starting point alerts theorists, lawyers,
and activists to reintegrate experience into the theoretics of prac
tice. It signals the continual rebuilding of theory in light of the
practical experiences of racial groups engaged in particular an
tiracist struggles, thus recasting the conceptual, perfonnative, and
material dimensions of a critical race praxis. 2 63
261. See Guyora Binder, What's Left?, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1985 (1991).
262. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 40, at 83-86 (describing racial changes having repre
sentational and social structural components).
263. These starting points help to assess the philosophy, goals, and procedures of the
movements to remake civil justice in post-civil rights America. Those movements include the
reform of the federal courts pushed by Congress as well as by, or sometimes in competition
with, the federal judiciary, see Judith Resnik, History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts:
Changing Contexts, Selective Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W. VA. L. RBv. 171
(1995) (describing proposed restructuring of federal court system); the alternative dispute
resolution juggernaut supported by most legislators, judges, lawyers, and organizations, see
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Implications

What are the main implications of critical race praxis and its
starting points?, bearing on the problems of disjuncture and dissoci
ation described earlier. The first is the need to ground justice in
concrete racial realities; the second, the reframing of racial justice
claims and court process as cultural performances; and the third,
the development of an interracial praxis.
1.

Justice and Racial Realities

One general implication of racial justice as praxis is the ground
ing of racial justice in concrete places, events, and group interac
tions. Practical justice is located in the messy social realities people
see, hear, touch, and sense, and it takes account of how
subordinated racial groups experience justice efforts.
Traditional theories of justice tend to be highly abstract and to
speak past social realities. They embrace broad principles of polit
ical and moral philosophy, scrutinizing law's theoretical legiti
macy.264 Separating justice into three conceptual camps distributive, corrective, and procedural - traditional theories tend
to translate poorly into concrete approaches for understanding and
addressing pressing real-life racial conflicts and prospects of
remediation or healing.26s
Critical race praxis, with its conceptual, performative, and mate
rial starting points, grounds racial justice in concrete situations.
Rather than beginning and ending justice analysis with philosophi
cal ideas or the opinions of appellate judges, it starts with inquiry
into the experiences and perceptions of racial groups and frontline
justice practitioners. The Profogue's description of Ho provides a
glimpse of the complex, shifting racial dynamics lying just beneath
the surface of the litigation's engagement with general legal princiEric K. Yamamoto, ADR: Where Have the Critics Gone?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1055,
1055-56 (1996) [hereinafter Yamamoto, ADR]; the possibilities of "popular justice" envi
sioned by political scientists and anthropologists, see MERRY & MILNER, supra note 256, at 3
(defining "genuinely popular justice" as "locally controlled, nonprofessional, and procedur
ally informal and that envisages a renewed community and decisions made according to com
munity norms"); the "reconciliation through justice" advanced by theologians drafting the
Kairos Covenant opposing South African apartheid, see THE KA1Ros COVENANT (Willis H.
Logan ed., 1988) (prophetic theological challenge to apartheid in South Africa); the "law as
part of larger political strategies" approach of environmental justice proponents, see Cole,
supra note 246, at 654; and the community-centered problem solving of "rebellious lawyer
ing," see L6PEZ, supra note 44.
264. See, e.g., JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusncE (1971).
265. See AN'IHONY D'AMATO & ARTHUR J. JACOBSON, JusnCE AND THE LEGAL SYS
TEM 10 (1992); KENNE'IH MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECilON AND J US"nCE 23 (1995).
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pies and specific procedural rules. A race praxis examines those
dynamics and the people and organizations · involved and focuses
pragmatically on what theories and concepts provide workable ap
proaches for understanding and diminishing oppressive racial
conditions.
This grounding is important because it recommits theorists and
activists to each other and to "making a difference" by connecting
discourse analysis with justice practice and the material conditions
of people's lives. As discussed earlier, progressive race theorizing
tends to emphasize discursive strategies. Images and language oft
entimes are mapped as the battleground. Indeed, the way we talk
influences the way we think and act. That is why, when an interra
cial controversy arises, print and electronic journalists, politicians,
scholars, businesses, and group spokespersons clamor for opportu
nities to shape ideas and images. During the post-Rodney King po
lice trial firestorm, for example, the portrayal of interracial conflict
by journalists (remember television shots of armed Korean Ameri
can storeowners atop their shops) and politicians (recall President
Bush's castigation of welfare dependency) created lasting impres
sions of intergroup hostility and sloth. Later, conciliatory, coali
tion-building efforts by African Americans, Asian Americans, and
Latinos in South Central Los Angeles struggled not only with inter
nal tensions over funding allocations and political voice but also
with overwhelmingly negative public images of intergroup relations.
When Chinese Americans in Ho launched a legal challenge to the
San Francisco School District's court-ordered affirmative action
program in 1994, the initial battle focused on competing racial por
trayals of the lawsuit. Was the suit about "preferred" African
Americans and Latinos displacing "better qualified" children of
Chinese immigrants and whites, or, conversely, about Asian Ameri
cans oppressing African Americans and Latinos by carrying out ne
oconservative whites' designs to dismantle all affirmative action?
At the level of ideas and images, discourses, or more precisely dis
cursive strategies, embody power. Making a difference at least par
tially entails the power to tap communicative channels and the
insight to reconstruct public events and rearticulate images and
ideas about racial identities and group relations.
Progressive race theory's tendency toward preoccupation with
discourse is problematic, however, because it comes at the overall
expense of the concrete and particular. A quip attributed to an Af
rican American scholar vivifies the problem: understanding that
race is a social construction does not help him get a taxi late at
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night.266 Dismantling disabling group constraints and redressing
the group harms requires engagement in, and the connection of dis
course analysis with, actual interactions among members of differ
ent racial groups in specific locales. At the face-to-face intergroup
level, material goods, human interactions, access to political chan
nels, along with discursive strategies, embody power. Making a dif
ference entails the power and insight simultaneously to adjust the
material aspects of race relations and to rearticulate intergroup
identities.
The potential sites of interaction are many and varied and exist
both within and beyond legal settings. Legal claims call forth sev
eral possible forums. Most legal claims are settled outside the
courtroom through the joint efforts of parties, attorneys, and some
times judges. Participants in a case construct and agree upon the
controversy's resolution. Even when claims are not settled, and a
court enjoins a defendant from specific future discriminatory be
havior, some degree of cooperation and trust is required of the par
ties to prevent eruptions over the defendant's compliance efforts.
In addition, other opportunities exist, and are often encouraged, to
resolve legal claims outside the formal litigation process. Methods
of alternative dispute resolution, such as mediation and arbitration,
with greater informality and speed, are employed by choice of par
ticipants or by court order.267 Each of these sites for the resolution
of legal claims enmeshed in racial conflicts offers opportunities for
racial justice inquiry, rumination, and action.26s
Myriad other sites also provide opportunities for the resolution
of justice claims at and beyond the edges of formal law. Religious
denominations, such as the United Church of Christ and the South
ern Baptists, integrating insights of theology, law, and social psy
chology, wrestle with racial conflict and healing at both national
and local polity decisional meetings.269 Labor unions offer toler
ance workshops and adjudicate highly charged group-based griev
ances concerning racism not only by outsiders but also within their
own ranks. Racial coalitions sometimes coalesce and then splinter
in search of political or economic common ground, foundering on
266. See DAVID ROEDIGER, THE ABOLIDON OF WHITENESS 1 (1994).
267. See generally Yamamoto, ADR, supra note 263 (describing wide and increasingly
less critical embrace of alternative dispute resolution).
268. See generally MERRY & MILNER, supra note 256, at 4.
269. See Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances, supra note 149, at 39 (discussing United
Church of Christ national and local apologies to Native Hawaiians for complicity in over
throw of sovereign Hawaiian government and in destruction of Hawaiian culture).
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unacknowledged long-held intergroup stereotypes and grudges.27o
Students on university campuses, seeking to interact across groups
in dormitories and classes, bring with them from the social world
intergroup baggage loaded with misunderstandings and tensions.
Racially charged economic boycotts bring groups face-to-face,
sometimes on collision courses, often at high decibel levels.271
Each of these sites, or situations, compresses the conflicting
drives of racial groups. One drive is toward peaceable relations:
the desire to make peace and reconcile; to live side by side if not
together; to work and play with each other. The other drive is to
ward separation: the desire to attack perceived misuses of group
position and power by others; to distance one's group from the of
fending other. For each of these widely varying sites, critical race
praxis directs race scholars and political lawyers to integrate their
efforts and ground them in the concrete social realities of racial
communities' struggles for justice.

2. Justice Claims and Legal Process as Cultural Performances
A second general implication of seeing racial justice as praxis is
an expanded vision of courts, legal process, and justice claims as
integral components of larger cultural performances. This praxis
notion of justice claims and legal process as cultural performance
speaks to those working with legal claims framed within "broader
political strategies. "272
Critical race praxis deepens the notions of community-based law
advanced by Lopez and Cole and reframes processes of legal justice
for racial minorities in terms of cultural and communicative limita
tions and possibilities. It recognizes justice claims and legal process
as an integral part of political-cultural processes that generate
"structures of meaning that radiate throughout social life and serve
as part of the material people use to negotiate their understanding
270. See Haunani·Kay Trask, Coalition·Bui/ding Between Native and Non·Natives, 43
STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1205-13 (1991).
271. Some see these racial-political disputes as disguised issues of free speech law and
laissez faire economics - media and legal scholars quickly cast the Korean American polit
ical association's boycott of Ice Cube's "Black Korea" rap in that fashion. See Jeff Chang,
Race, Class, Conflict and Empowerment: On Ice Cube's "Black Korea," AMERASIA J. Vol. 19,
No. 2, 1993, at 87, 93-96 (describing how whites "created a defining perspective" in narrowly
legalist terms of "whether
content required censorship"). Others frame the disputes
around issues of local business and cultural respect - community organizations so described
the African American boycott against inner-city Korean American merchants in New York.
See id. at 88.
272. See Cole, supra note 246, at 648.
.

.
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of everyday events and relationships."273 It searches critically for
ways to locate justice processes and outcomes within larger commu
nity struggles; it searches pragmatically for resonance within racial
communities.
A multifaceted antisubordination practice for communities of
color can start with judges and lawyers and legal process - most
Americans, to some degree, are familiar with legal systems. It can,
and I assert should, start with law, because substantive legal princi
ples of equality, liberty, and fairness, and legal process values of
dignity and participation, at least in the abstract, provide a strong
modernist core.274 But, as discussed, often legal doctrines are nar
rowly drawn and legal principles and values are vaguely stated.
While their abstract appeal persists, their practical manifestation for
many racial minorities fails to resonate.
Critical race praxis, with its emphasis on critical pragmatism and
multidisciplinarity, suggests reconfiguring notions of legal justice to
encompass racial community understandings of conflict, redress,
and healing - understandings illuminated by a mix of law, history,
theology, social psychology, political theory, and ethnic or indige
nous cultural practices; understandings that play out in the daily
practices of business, bankruptcy, labor, landlord-tenant, immigra
tion, and family law as well as evidence and procedure.275 Recon
figuring legal justice in this way entails rethinking the functions of
courts, judges, lawyers, and community organizations and acknowl
edging the cultural dimensions of justice claims and legal process.
Racial justice can be reframed beyond traditional institutional legal
players. It can embrace the idea that courts and law stimulate
socio-cultural thinking about justice and that jury verdicts and nar
row legal judgments alone do not necessarily define what is just for
racialized communities.
As I have written elsewhere,276 vantage point is key. From one
view, courts are simply deciders of particular disputes involving spe
cific parties according to established norms. From another view,
courts are also integral parts of a larger communicative process.
Particularly in a setting of hotly contested racial controversies,
273. Trubek, supra note 94, at 124.
274. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right
to Protect One's Rights, 1973 DuKE LJ. 1153, 1172-73 (identifying litigation process values of
dignity, participation, deterrence (or social welfare) and effectuation).
275. See Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances, supra note 149, at 65 (summarizing ways in
which disciplines other than law address intergroup healing and reconciliation).
276. Much of the next two pages, including citations, is taken more or less verbatim from
part of an earlier work. See Yamamoto et al., Cultural Performance, supra note 238, at 17.
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courts tend to help focus cultural issues, to illuminate institutional
power arrangements, and to tell counter-stories in ways that assist
in the reconstruction of intergroup relationships and aid larger so
cial-political movements. In those situations, court process can be
seen as a cultural performance and justice can be viewed in part as
the transformation of oppressive dominant racial and cultural
narratives.
As Gerald Torres and Kathryn Milan observe, "[w]ithin a soci
ety, there are specific places where most of the activities making up
social life within that society simultaneously are represented, con
tested, and inverted. Courts are such places."277 This observation
is reinforced by the studies of socio-legal scholars that conclude that
case handling by courts can be viewed as "cultural performances,
events that produce transformations in socio-cultural practices and
in consciousness."278 Those transformations may tend to be repres
sive, legitimizing harsh imbalances of power in social relationships;
they may tend to be liberatory, opposing, or reconfiguring, en
trenched group images and relationships; or they may reflect some
complex, shifting combination of the two. Those transformations
may occur as accretions over time, little noticed; or they may
emerge in the jolt of a singular case-event. Of course, relatively few
court cases singularly produce transformations in socio-cultural
practices and in consciousness. Those that do tend to occur when
the legal dispute is reflective of a larger, ongoing social-political
controversy. Other factors - location, media attention, commu
nity organizing, related lawsuits, and legislative initiatives - are
significant.
This view of courts as dynamic sites and generators of cultural
performances is supported generally by dispute transformation the
ory. According to this theory, each stage of the court process in
varying ways contributes to a "rephrasing" of the dispute.279 Deci
sions concerning initial claim assertion followed by decisions con
cerning pretrial discovery, sanctions, and overall case management
- including motions, settlement maneuvering, and legal-issue for
mulation - redefine the claimant's understanding and framing of
277. Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnondio: By Precedent and Evi
dence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DuKE LJ. 625, 628 (footnote omitted).
278. Sally E. Merry, Law and Colonialism, 25 LAW & SoCY. REv. 889, 892 (1991).
279. See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence And Transformation Of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . . , 15 LAw & SoCY. REV. 631 (1980-1981); Lynn Mather &
Barbara Yngvesson, Language, Audience and the Transformation of Disputes, 15 LAW &
SoCY. REV. 775, 780 (1980-81); see also Bryant G. Garth, Power and Legal Artifice: The
Federal Class Action, 26 LAW & SoCY. REV. 237, 240 (1992).
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the controversy. The interactions among parties, attorneys, judge,
court personnel, community groups, and general public, through
the media and the trial itself, further contribute to this rephrasing at
the trial court level. Decisions by appellate courts, more detached
and, in some respects more far-reaching, further solidify the court
system's dispute rephrasing performance. As Mather and Yngves
son observe, a legally phrased claim is a "social construct which or
ders "facts' and invokes "norms' in particular ways - ways that
reflect the personal interest or values" of the describer.28° Con
cerns critical to the rephrasing process thus arise: Who has court
access; who controls claim development and presentation; accord
ing to what standards and from what perspectives; . who reports on
the contextual facts; and according to what sele�tion criteria? What
cultural values collide and emerge in the interaction� of judges, par
ties, attorneys, communities, and media? These concerns shape the
contours and content of a court system's overall cultural perform
ance. From this view, courts in important instances not only decide
disputes, they also transform particular legal controversies and
rights claims into larger public message�.2s1
Those messages . can be thought of as socio-legal narratives
about groups, institutions, and their interactions. The shaping and
retelling of stories through court process can help either to rein
force or to counter a prevailing cultural narrative in a given com
munity. A prevailing, or master, narrative provides a principal lens
through which groupings of people in a community see and inter
pret events and actions. It provides a set of basic assumptions for
evaluating social-political controversies and the relationships of the
groups involved.282
.A, counternarrative challenges those assumptions and the van
tage point from which they are made. By offering a "framework
not previously accepted," the counternarrative challenges "estab
lished categories for classifying events and relationships by linking
subjects or issues that are typically separated" or by elevating previ
ously suppressed voices, thus " "stretching' or changing accepted
frameworks for organizing reality."283 It thereby undermines the
280. Mather & Yngvesson, supra note 279, at 780; see also Judith Resnik, On The Bias:
Feminist Reconsiderations of The Aspirations For Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1877, 1905
(1988) (noting that judicial judgment cannot escape the inevitability of perspective and
choice of those who judge).
281. See Yamamoto et al., Cultural Performance, supra note 238, at 20-21.
282. See id. at 21-22.
283. Mather & Yngvesson, supra note 279, at 778-79; see also Delgado, Storytelling for
Oppositionists, supra note 239.
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clarity and strength of the master narrative by infusing complexity
and providing a competing perspective.
Historically, for example, master socio-legal narratives about in
digenous groups have tended to characterize their subordinated sit
uations as inevitable, due to the groups' inferiority, or as
insignificant, due to the passage of time and past remedial efforts.284
Subordinating socio-legal narratives have thus long fixed blame for
Native Hawaiians' physical and cultural destruction on their inferi
ority and "semi-barbarous face."2ss
Court rulings have reinforced such master narratives, and harsh
societal actions have been justified by them. Many racialized
groups now counter master cultural narratives with narratives of
their own - not only telling stories of historical and contemporary
victimization but also offering normative precepts for future social
structural change. These counternarratives are rooted in history
and culture. And they are rooted in law.
There is growing recognition of the power of legal storytelling in
the construction of counternarratives in legal process. Nell Newton
describes how "claims stories [by Native Americans], when broken
from the dry legal recitation of the facts in the cases and placed in
context, reveal powerfully the inadequacies of the dominant
group's stories."286 In this setting, racialized groups and indigenous
groups in particular are both asserting rights claims within narrow
and expansive frameworks and rethinking and recasting the "cul
tural performance" role of courts in addressing race-political
controversies.
This rethinking parallels shifting perceptions of the judicial role
in civil rights litigation. It reflects in part the transformation from
the civil rights activity of the 1960s and early 1970s to the post-civil
rights era.287 For racial minorities, the current post-civil rights era
might be characterized generally by a reconceptualizing of the role
of courts and law as part of, rather than as the pinnacle of, political
strategies for social structural change; the movement away from
284. See Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror, 41 AM. U. L.
REv. 753, 760-61 (1992); see also S. James Anaya, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and
International Law in Historical and Contemporary Perspective, 1989 HARV. INDIAN L. SYMP.
191, 199-204 (1990); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of International
Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms ofIndigenous Peoples' Survival in the World, 1990
DUKE LJ. 660, 673-76. See generally CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME,
AND nm LAw (1986).
285. See 26 CoNG. REc. 1885 (1894).
286. Newton, supra note 284, at 760.
287. See Yamamoto et al., Cultural Performance, supra note 238, at 26 (describing the
transformed role of courts and rights litigation in post-civil rights America).
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principal reliance on narrow judicial remedies toward the additional
use of courts as forums for the development and expressions of
counter-narratives and for the promotion of local empowerment
and community control; and a rising importance of state or other
local forums for developing and hearing outsider claims.288

3.

Interracial Praxis: Beyond the White-Black Jurisprudential
Paradigm

By grounding justice inquiry in concrete group experiences and
envisioning justice claims and legal process as components of cul
tural performances, critical race praxis asks, "In what kinds of racial
controversies is the law experienced as dissociated from justice? "
More specifically, what kinds of justice claims for racial minorities
fall beyond the limits of contemporary antidiscrimination law? One
response is claims to interracial justice. Those claims in concept
and practice appear to exceed the boundaries of the white-black
jurisprudential paradigm and yet are constantly cast within it.289 A
third implication of thinking about racial justice as praxis thus is
expanded jurisprudential inquiry into a realm largely ignored by
courts and legal scholars. This inquiry is attentive to continuing
white influence over all facets of race relations in America and rec
ognizes the unique effects of slavery for African Americans. It nev
ertheless moves beyond binary oppositions of white versus black,
majority versus minority, perpetrator versus victim. It endeavors to
shift from margin to center issues of interminority justice.
This expanded inquiry takes seriously not only interminority
competition and conflict but also the social and legal ramifications
of continued intergroup tension on the one hand and healing and
reconciliation on the other. Indeed, the intensifying call by many
for deepening alliances and broader coalitions among communities
of color means heightened attention to intergroup healing and rec
onciliation. As Elizabeth Martinez observes, in light of the pain of
intergroup prejudices, resentments, and competition, alliances
among groups of color "require a knowledge and wisdom that we
have yet to attain."290
288. See id. at 27.
289. See Martinez, supra note 149; Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances, supra note 149; Be
yond Black and White: Race-Conscious Policies and "Other Minorities" in Conference, Race,
Law and Justice: The Rehnquist Court and the American Dilemma, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 601
(1996).
290. Martinez, supra note 149, at 22.
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An interracial praxis, moving beyond the white-black jurispru
dential paradigm, addresses intergroup prejudices and resentments
as well as possibilities for healing and reconciliation. It focuses on
the obstacle of felt injustice in the struggles of groups endeavoring
to "live together peaceably and work together politically."291 I de
velop the full dimensions of an interracial praxis in a forthcoming
work.292 The remainder of this section sketches one aspect of that
praxis: inquiry into racial group agency and responsibility. I dis
cuss this aspect of interracial praxis because, in contemplating the
dissociation of law from racial justice, it rethinks the framing and
handling of interracial justice grievances underlying many inter
group conflicts and legal claims.
An interracial praxis rethinks concepts of colorblindness, group
fungibility, hierarchy, cultural discrimination, and multiracial con
flict, among others; and it examines in concrete controversies how
those concepts, employed by courts, legislatures, administrative bu
reaucracies, schools, churches, and the media, shape interracial
identities and relationships, construct intergroup conflicts, and fash
ion dispute resolution possibilities.293 As part of that critical socio
legal interrogation, an interracial praxis assesses complex power ar
rangements often undergirding particular intergroup conflicts and
justice claims especially where one group with some emergent
socio-political power is charged by another group with redeploying
structures of oppression. For example, in Ho and in United Minori
ties, African American, Asian American, and Latino intergroup
power relationships are productively assessed according to a theory
of power that recognizes that members of racialized groups are
neither fully autonomous nor puppets controlled by others but are
instead social actors empowered and constrained by multiple socio
economic settings. Such a situated theory of power294 acknowl291. Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances, supra note 149, at 33.
292. See Eruc K. yAMAMOTO, RACE, CULTURE AND RESPONSIBILITY: INTERRACIAL Jus.
TICE IN POST-CIVIL RIGHIS AMERICA {forthcoming 1997).
293. See supra notes 215-19, 252-63 and accompanying text.
294. The idea of situated power departs from prevailing polarized ethnicity (all culture)
and nationalism {all structure) views of racial group agency. See Yamamoto, Rethinking Alli·
ances, supra note 149, at 53-56 (describing neoconservative ethnicity theory's "autonomous
agent" approach and the polar colonialism-nationalism "no agency" structuralist approach).
Drawing upon Thomas Wartenberg's exploration of the dynamics of one group's "power
over" another, see THOMAS E. WARTENBERG, THE FORMS OF POWER: FROM DOMINATION
TO TRANSFORMATION 71 {1990), a situated power approach suggests that racial group agency
and responsibility are both enlivened and constrained by context. Power over is understood
as one group's capacity in a particular socio-political setting, or "field," to constrain the ac
tion alternatives of another group. See id. at 71-72. Those group action alternatives involve
self-definition (identity), self-perpetuation (culture and economics), and self-determination
(politics).
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edges the capacity of racial groups, amid changing racial
demographics and socio-economic structures, to be simultaneously
oppressed and oppressive, liberating and subordinating.29s
This idea of situated group power, generally stated, yields four
understandings about racial group agency enlivened and con
strained by context. Those understandings, summarized here,
which illuminate a praxis view of intergroup conflicts and healing
prospects, are simultaneity, positionality, differentiation, and domi
nance-transformation.
The first understanding is simultaneity. It means that a racial
group can be viewed as uplifting and subordinating, oppressed and
oppressive, depending on the power relationships involved. Simul
taneity is characterized by racial groups that have resisted domina
tion from above and have obtained some degree of socio-economic
power, and that situationally redeploy structures oppressive to
them to oppress others.296 Those structures can be political, cul
tural, economic, or rhetorical in form. Rey Chow observes that as
multiculturalism and "rhetorical claims to political change and dif
ference" are advanced, "many deep-rooted, politically reactionary
forces return to haunt us." The "new solidarities" generated by
these forces "are often informed by a strategic attitude which re
peats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies
being reinforced . . . is immense."297 Simultaneity is a particular
phenomenon of "borderland sites" - "locales in which situations
historically oppressive to racial [and other outsider] groups are un
dergoing demographic, economic and socio-political change" and
are marked by "continuing struggles for identity and power."298
The second understanding is positionality. It builds upon and
deepens the idea of simultaneity. It means that racial group agency
needs to be understood as multirelational. Each social actor is en
gaged in multiple relationships. Relationships defined at least in
part by race, class, gender, culture� sexual orientation, age, disabil
ity, or locale implicate different axes of power. Each axis of power
forms a context within which domination can occur. Social actors
thus are situated within multiple relational contexts, with possibili
ties for dominating and being dominated. "Victims can also be vie295. See Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances, supra note 149, at 58 (articulating the notion
of agency constrained and enlivened by social settings).
296. See id. at 52.
297. REY CHow, WRlTING DIASPORA: TACTICS OF INTERVENTION IN CONTEMPORARY
CuLTURAL STUDIES 16-17 (1993).
298. Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances, supra note 149, at 52 (discussing postcolonial the
ory and the concept of "borderland sites").
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timizers; agents of change can also be complicitous, depending on
the particular axis of power . . . "299 This explains an agent's poten
tial for simultaneity, for being privileged and oppressed.
.

Positionality extends simultaneity by providing insight into the
deeply layered notion of responsibility. It does so by focusing on
the position and comparative power of an actor within each rela
tionship, within each context. Identifying an actor's power position
within a given context helps identify its potential as an agent or
object of domination, or both. This means that an actor may be
oppressed within one context, may therefore make justice claims
against those with power over that actor in that context, may also
be oppressive in another context, and may therefore be responsible
for the justice claims of. those over whom it exerts power. Feminist
legal theory at the crossroads of race and gender, with its interroga
tion of white women's racial privilege, provides insight into this "re
lational positionality. "3oo
The third understanding is differentiation. The ideas of simulta
neity and positionality, drawn from postcolonial and feminist legal
theory, explain multiple relational contexts and the potential of so
cial actors to be both oppressed and oppressive. They also address
the importance of evaluating the power positions of an actor within
each of many relationships and identifying differing axes of power
and systems of potential domination. They do not, however, ad
dress interracial dominance - how within a system or context of
racial domination, where racial minorities are struggling against
white domination, a nonwhite racial group acquires and exercises
power over another.
Differential racialization and the related notion of differential
disempowerment assist in this inquiry.301 These anti-essentialist
ideas highlight differential power among racial groups as a central
feature of interracial conflicts. They recognize that racial groups
are racialized differently - that varying historical experiences and
current socio-economic conditions create different racial images,
status and power among racial groups, and that those differences
contribute to intergroup conflict.302 Both ideas account for differ
ential racial group agency in the construction and maintenance of
299. Susan Stanford Friedman, Beyond White and Other: Relationality and Narratives of
Race in Feminist Discourse, SIGNS 1, 18 {1995).
300. See id. at 16·20 (describing relational positionality).
301. See Michael Omi, Out ofthe Melting Pot and Into the Fire: Race Relations Policy, in
THE STATE OF ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICA 207 {1993) {describing differential racialization
within a racial group according to class differences).
302. See Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances, supra note 149, at 59-60.
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racial hierarchies and differential racial group responsibility for dis
mantling those hierarchies. Rooted in critical sociology, differential
racialization and disempowerment thus acknowledge that racial
groups, even while themselves struggling against domination by
others, sometimes, and in complex ways, exercise power over others
and that this exercise of power occasionally generates or exacer
bates interracial confiict.303
The final understanding, which relates to the others, is domi
nance-transformation. Reflecting the varying uses of one racial
group's power over another,304 dominance-transformation also con
nects group agency with responsibility. It addresses this question:
Under what circumstances does the exercise of one racial group's
power over another disable the other in terms of self-definition or
self-determination and thus entail responsibility for interracial
healing?3os
The extent of a racial group's power over another is determined
in part by its alignment with other social (often institutional) actors
within the group's field or socio-political setting.306 This notion of
alignment within a field is significant, because in any single relation
ship the central actors can be involved with multiple alignments,
creating shifting, colliding spaces for "power over." One group can
have power over another under certain circumstances, and the
power relationship can be reversed in other situations. Thus, at va
rying times, ethnic Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Filipino Ameri
cans aligned with one another along Asian American racial lines to
enhance political power, social voice, and entitlement distribu
tions.307 That intragroup alignment heightened Asian American
power in dealing with predominantly white-controlled institutions
and in working with and competing against other minorities. In Ho,
however, when several Chinese Americans sued to invalidate court
mandated affirmative action in San Francisco's public schools,3os
Asian American alignments fractured. The Chinese American
plaintiffs set themselves apart from other Asian ethnic groups. Sev303. See id.
304. See WARTENBERG, supra note 294, at 71-72.
305. See Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances, supra note 149, at 58.
306. See WARTENBERG, supra note 294, at 150. Wartenberg's theory of situated power
does not deal with race issues. The discussion here extends his theory into the realm of racial
group power.
307. See YEN LE ESPIRITU, AsIAN AMERICAN PANETHNICITY 14 (1992) (describing the
coalescence of Asian ethnic groups in America into an singular Asian American racial
identity).
308. Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., No. 94-2418 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, �996).
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eral Asian American political organizations (including Chinese
American groups) strongly opposed the suit. Other Asian Ameri
can groups, along with white journalists, conservative scholars, uni
versity administrators, and politicians, supported the suit's goal by
characterizing Asian Americans along with whites as victims of ra
cial preferences for African Americans and Latinos.309 The align
ment of neoconservative whites and Asian Americans with the
Chinese American plaintiffs enhanced Chinese American power
over African Americans and Latinos in the affirmative action
arena.
At the same time, in the racialized debate about immigration,
many whites and Asian Americans (primarily later generation and
middle class) aligned with African Americans in support of Califor
nia's Proposition 187 and other anti-immigrant measures, thus cre
ating a nativist citizen versus foreigner discourse and locating
middle class whites, Asian Americans, and a cross-section of Afri
can Americans against recent Asian and Latino immigrants. This
alignment conferred even socially and economically struggling Afri
can Americans with some degree of power over recent Asian and
Latino newcomers.
Group power, or agency, is derived in part from these kinds of
fluid, shifting alignments with others in the larger field.

These

alignments in turn are rooted in history and contemporary social
and economic conditions. Group agency is thus derived from both
internal practices and social context. Agency itself, however, does
not determine group responsibility. The racial group's choices in
the use of its ebbing and flowing power over another determine its
responsibility toward that other.310 Power over can be manifested
in a particular context through dominance - not only direct op
pression but also systemic subordination. It can also be manifested
by transformation - acknowledging and restructuring or at least
accounting for power imbalances.311 The former generates racial
harms for which the more powerful group bears responsibility. The
latter reflects an acceptance of responsibility and affirmative steps
toward interracial healing.
As part of a group's acceptance of that responsibility, an interra
cial praxis searches for practical, transformative exercises of "power
over." In seeking to better connect law with racial justice, it looks
309. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. .
310. See Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances, supra note 149, at 44.
311. See WARTENBERG, supra note 294, at 183-84.
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at law and beyond into the healing realms of theology, social psy
chology, peace studies, and indigenous practices, and it recognizes
that when groups seek to "live together peaceably and work to
gether politically," especially in times of disruptive equilibrium, the
healing of intergroup justice breaches and the rebuilding of inter
group relationships, often precede efforts to forge economic or
political-action coalitions.312

CONCLUSION
The opening of this article described the ongoing Ho and

Minorities

United

cases and suggested that the litigation of those cases

reveals a disjuncture between progressive race theory and political
lawyering practice as well as an apparent dissociation of law from
racial justice; It then presented a critical, pragmatic rethinking of
antidiscrimination law practice in ·the context of a jurisprudence of
reconstruction. And finally, it offered the beginnings of critical race
praxis response to problems of disjuncture and dissociation and
outlined three consequences of this approach
the grounding of
·

justice practice in concrete racial realities, the reframing of courts
and justice claims as cultural performances, and the development of
an interracial praxis.
The epilogue concludes with another ongoing story. The story
does not apply each of the critical race praxis starting points - the
conceptual, performative, material, and reflexive. Nor does it di
rectly illuminate praxis implications or generalize about "how to"
practice racial justice. Rather the story is a brief account of one
messy, concrete, incomplete intergroup race ·praxis effort. I leave
for the reader the task of evaluating whether the critical race praxis
starting points assist in assessing the efficacy and meaning of that
effort and, perhaps more important, whether the starting points
might provide meaningful guidance for future efforts.

EPILOGUE
' Auntie Alice Aiwohi, a Native Hawaiian, died recently at 81.
During adulthood she worked as a nurse on the island of Oahu,
Hawai'i. Upon retirement she returned to the island of her birth,
Moloka'i. Years earlier the State Department of Hawaiian Home
lands awarded her a Homelands parcel in up-country Moloka'i.
Upon her return, however,.the Department prohibited her from liv
ing there. No money was available for electricity or water and
312. See Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances, supra note 149, at 65.
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sewer systems for Homelands, officials said, and none was forth
coming. Auntie Alice defied the Homelands Department; she and
her seventy-five-year-old husband moved onto the parcel and lived
in an empty Safeway shipping container. Electric generator. Car
ried-in water. Outhouse. There she taught Hawaiian language and
history to young children and raised vegetables and flowers.
And there her anger simmered at having to defy state authority
to do what seemed to her right and natural: to live on and care for
Hawaiian land and to vitalize Hawaiian culture. Her anger was the
anger of others. Recognizing the devastating effects on Native
Hawaiians of the United States-aided overthrow of the Hawaiian
nation,313 Congress created the Hawaiian Homelands Trust in 1921
to return a portion of illegally seized government and crown lands
to Hawai'i's indigenous people.314 Administered first by the federal
government and now by the state as trustee, Homelands reflect for
many Hawaiians both a sacred relationship between Hawaiians and
the environment and a potential political and economic base for
Hawaiian self-governance. Homelands also symbolize continuing
governmental misfeasance in the treatment of Native Hawaiians less than twenty percent of the Homelands are leased to intended
trust beneficiaries; much of the prime lands are leased at low rents
to non-Hawaiians, including politicians and agribusiness. Other
lands, like Auntie Alice's, are deemed uninhabitable due to lack of
infrastructure; 20,000 Native Hawaiians remain on the Homelands
waiting list.315
Collective anger about Homelands mismanagement resurfaced
in 1992 when the state proposed a plan to redress twenty-five years
of illegal state confiscation of 30,000 acres of Homelands for non313. For accounts of Western interests' destruction of Hawaiian life and culture, including
the separation of Hawaiians from the land, see generally NATIVE HAWAIIAN RmJITS HAND·
BOOK (Melody Kapilialoho MacKenzie ed., 1991); LILIKALA KAME'ELEHIWA, NATIVE LAND
AND FOREIGN DESIRES: PEHEA LA E PONO AI? (1992).
314. The history of Hawaiian Homelands includes the United States-aided forceful over
throw of the Hawaiian monarchy in 1893 by a few American businessmen and religious lead
ers; the appropriation of all former government and crown lands by the United States upon
annexation in 1898; the return of200,000 acres in trust in 1921 for use by Native Hawaiians to
"rehabilitate" them; the transfer of the Homelands Trust to the State of Hawai'i upon state
hood in 1959; the widespread mismanagement of the trust so that more than 60% of Hawai
ian Homelands is in military and non-Hawaiian hands, and only 18% is occupied by Native
Hawaiians; 20,000 Native Hawaiians are on the Homelands waiting list, and some have been
there for decades. See generally HAWAn ADv. COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL R1G1ITS,
A BROKEN TRUST, THE HAWAilAN HOMELANDS PROGRAM: SEVENTY YEARS OF FAILURE
OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS TO PROTECT THE CIVIL RIGIITS OF NATIVE
HAWAilANS (1991) [hereinafter A BROKEN TRUST]; Yamamoto et al., Cultural Performance,
supra note 238, at 10-12 nn.32-35.
315. See A BROKEN TRUST, supra note 314.
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Homelands purposes (such as state roads and airports). To avoid
breach-of-trust lawsuits, the governor's office formed a Task Force
to determine "fair compensation," to settle Native Hawaiian claims.
Consistent with its other actions, the governor's office sought to
rectify injustice to Hawaiians and infuse working capital into the
Homelands program while accommodating other state needs.
Problems arose at the outset. The Task Force was comprised of
the governor's office (representing the state as principal wrongdoer
in the trust breaches) and the director of the State Department of
Hawaiian Homelands (representing the Department as passive
wrongdoer). Both were advised by the State Attorney General
(whose office had allowed the misappropriation for twenty-five
years). Conflicts of interest abounded. A Native Hawaiian com
munity advocacy group demanded to participate on the Task Force
to represent the trust's beneficiaries. The Task Force said no, we'll
do what's best for Hawaiians.
·

But the Task Force didn't. It sharply undervalued compensation
claims. For example, one tract used by the state for years as a small
airport was valued at one dollar per acre per year. In addition, the
Task Force recommended that the state pay compensation only if
the Homelands Department, on behalf of Native Hawaiians, waived
rights to undercompensated or uncompensated claims. That waiver
would likely eliminate the future assertion of claims against the
state by a self-governing Native Hawaiian entity created to control
Hawaiian lands.
Confusion ensued. . Some believed that the state finally was ac
knowledging a wrong to Hawaiians and doing something about it.
For the first time in years there would be money

($5 million to $12

million immediately and $38 million total) to build infrastructure on
Homelands. Others, while agreeing with the settlement undertak
ing, reacted angrily to its process and outcome. Members of Hui
Na'ao'ao (a coalition of 40 Hawaiian prosovereignty groups), the
Kalamaula Homesteaders (of Moloka'i), and the West Maui
Moloka'i Taro Farmers Association (a taro growers collective) re
sponded thus: "Slammed-out again." "Lip service compensation.
Where's the justice?" "That's what happens when the government
takes our land, breaks our way of life and then tells us, don't worry,
don't get involved, we'll take care of it." Auntie Alice also re
sponded: "We've got to stop this, or they'll just keep doing it."
While long-simmering Hawaiian community frustration with the
Homelands Trust boiled over, a small group of political lawyers and
Hawaiian activists began to analyze the proposed release-waiver of
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claims and to scrutinize the appraisals supporting the Task Force's
settlement calculations. As community leaders, political lawyers,
and race-law theorists

met,

questions

arose:

Should Native

Hawaiians resist? If so, how could they fight to participate in the
settlement process and increase the settlement amount without
scuttling the undertaking altogether? Of what use were the courts?
The media? What political and legal outcomes were conceivable?
Initial liberal legal responses to questions about legal action
were both complicated and refined by the critical, pragmatic in
quiry. On the side of risk: What damage might be done by legaliz
ing the dispute and situating it within a largely Western court
system?

Haven't Native Hawaiians consistently lost even their

strongest breach-of-trust claims on procedural grounds?316 How
were largely negative cultural narratives about Native Hawaiians
inscribed in and reproduced by federal and state law concerning
Hawaiian trust lands? Might the state, with its superior resources
and appointed judges, control any legal proceeding and the public
messages emanating from it? On the side of opportunity: How
might court process assist in transforming dominant cultural-legal
narratives about Native Hawaiians and Hawaiian Homelands?
What reconstructed cultural messages about Native Hawaiians
might be communicated - political and economic self-determina
tion? cultural revitalization? recognition of agency and responsibil
ity not only by whites, with a history of oligarchical control and
present-day predominance over business and media, but also by
Japanese and Chinese Americans, with disproportionate represen
tation in local politics and government bureaucracy? How might
these messages impact upon the larger sovereignty movement and
connect with the justice struggles of Native Americans and indige
nous peoples throughout the world? What might be the value of
public airing of justice grievances and cross-examination of key
government administrators? For what audiences? And with what
backlash?
Following sometimes heated discussions, a core group formed.
The group was comprised of Homelands and prosovereignty activ
ists, Hawaiian, white, and Asian American attorneys from two Ha
waiian legal advocacy groups, a Hawaiian attorney with a large-firm
commercial litigation practice, and an Asian American law profes
sor specializing in complex litigation and race theory. Although dif
fering in its views on several issues, the group agreed that a
316. See Yamamoto et al., Cultural Performance, supra note 238, at 29.
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favorable legal outcome, on the law alone, seemed unlikely. A
suit's breach-of-trust and due process claims to eliminate the waiver
and allow participation of an independent Hawaiian representative
on the Task Force, while plausible, would be fraught with problems,
including governmental immunity and political question obstacles.
The group agreed, however, that on balance a legal challenge would
likely "assist larger political strategies," especially in the context of
the prosovereignty movement, the continuing protests against
Homelands mismanagement, and the state administration's general
openness to hearing Hawaiian justice claims. Finally, the group co
alesced around the justice claims at stake: self-determination for,
rather than paternalism over, Native Hawaiians; full compensation
for illegally confiscated Homelands; and elimination of the broad
waiver of claims.
Auntie Alice and Homelands activists Charles Ka'ai'ai and Rob
ert Asing served as plaintiffs in

Ka'ai'ai v. Drake. 311

The prosover

eignty activist on the core group kept Hui Na'ao'ao apprised of
developments and prepared with responses to backlash from some
state officials and Hawaiian groups about the "irresponsible ob
structionists blocking needed money for Homelands."318 The core
group organized press conferences and community group meetings
to advance the plaintiffs ' story. What followed included the filing of
the complaint in federal court; the suit's voluntary dismissal and its
refiling in state court; the public "trial" and cross-examination of
key government officials on the temporary restraining order-pre
liminary injunction application; coverage by media and journalists;
the granting of the restraining order (the first such order granted
against the state in a Hawaiian land trust case); a partial settlement
requiring the state to pay immediately the Task Force's recom
mended amount as a floor, not a ceiling, and eliminating the
waiver-release; summary judgment for the state on political ques
tion grounds dismissing the claim for appointment of an independ
ent representative to the Task Force; a stay of judgment while the
core group lobbied successfully for legislation (and funding) author
izing the court to appoint an independent representative; the vaca
tion of the summary judgment and the certification of a class action
with subclasses; the court's selection and appointment of a Home
lands beneficiary representative to the Task Force; the Task Force's
reconsideration of all compensation claims, increasing its initial rec317. Civil No. 92-3742-10 (1st Cir. Haw., Oct. 1992).
318. Interview with Wiiiiam Meheula, Lead Counsel for Charles Ka'ai'ai et al., Ka'ai'ai v.
Drake, in Honolulu, Haw. (March 25, 1994).

900

Michigan Law Review

ommendation from

$38

million to over

$300
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million; and the

legislature's commitment to pay to the Homelands Trust
a year for 20 years
$600 million total.

1995
$30 million

-

The story, of course, continues. The Department of Hawaiian
Homelands, which vigorously opposed the suit, now, with a new
director, embraces its result; Homelands infrastructure is growing at
an accelerated pace.

Some Hawaiians celebrate the cultural

messages conveyed to the public - the acknowledgement of long
term state-inflicted harm upon Hawaiians and the salience of pres
ent-day Hawaiian self-determination. Some worry, however, that
for many Hawaiians the long, bitter wait will continue and that the
settlement will hinder the push toward sovereignty. Others, includ
ing influential politicians, faced with a state fiscal crunch, worry
about "too much, too fast" for Hawaiians and wonder about pos
sibilities for rescinding the legislature's payment commitment. Still
others among the public chafe at what they perceive as a "racial
preference" for "undeserving Native Hawaiians."319 As mentioned,
with this brief account of Ka'ai'ai v.

Drake,320 I leave for the reader

the task of evaluating whether the beginning critical race praxis
starting points offered and praxis implications identified might help
shape and assess collective, reflective antisubordination practice in
messy, never-finished justice situations like this.

319. See Greg Barrett, Hawaiian Homelands: Long, Bitter Wait, HONOLULU ADVER
TISER, Oct. 20, 1996, at Al.
320. Writing about what I do enables me to work from the inside out, to tell stories and
generate structure from those stories. But it also sometimes limits my range of vision and
obscures other viewpoints. These limitations color my brief account of Ka'ai'ai v. Drake. I
was the law professor member of the core group, and my role was that of theorist
proceduralist, class action counsel and participant-observer. See Yamamoto et al., Cultural
Performance, supra note 238, at 76 & n.279 and accompanying text for further discussion of
the case.

